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Abstract
This paper proposes and axiomatizes a new updating rule: Relative Maximum Likelihood
(RML) for ambiguous beliefs represented by a set of priors (C). This rule takes the form of
applying Bayes’ rule to a subset of the set C . This subset is a linear contraction of C towards
its subset assigning a maximal probability to the observed event. The degree of contraction
captures the extent of willingness to discard priors based on likelihood when updating. Two
well-known updating rules of multiple priors, Full Bayesian (FB) and Maximum Likelihood
(ML), are included as special cases of RML.
An axiomatic characterization of conditional preferences generated by RML updating is
provided when the preferences admit Maxmin Expected Utility representations. The axioma-
tization relies on weakening the axioms characterizing FB and ML. The axiom characterizing
ML is identified for the first time in this paper, addressing a long-standing open question in the
literature.
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1 Introduction
For decisions under uncertainty, when information is not sufficient to pin down a unique distribu-
tion over the states, the decision maker (DM)’s revealed preference sometimes is not consistent
with any single probabilistic belief, but it could be consistent with a set of priors (Ellsberg, 1961;
Machina and Schmeidler, 1992). When this DM learns additional information, the updating of
such a set of priors may actually involve two steps. First, she could use this information to make
inferences about the plausibility of each prior and discard the ones deemed to be implausible. Sec-
ond, she applies Bayes’ rule to update every prior in this refined set conditional on the information
received.
The two most popular updating rules for multiple priors, Full Bayesian (FB)1 andMaximum
Likelihood (ML), are both examples of such an updating procedure. FB takes the form of applying
Bayes’ rule to the entire set of priors. In other words, the DM does not discard any prior under FB
updating. On the other hand, under ML the DM discards all the priors that do not ascribe maximal
probability (among all priors in the set) to the observed event and updates the remaining priors
according to Bayes’ rule. Therefore, FB and ML can be regarded as two polar extremes in terms
of discarding priors based on the likelihood of the observed event in updating.
However, sometimes, a DM may not be willing to be as extreme as either case. For example,
she may be willing to discard priors assigning a very small probability to the observed event,
but keep priors assigning an almost maximal probability. Even though this type of intermediate
updating seems to be as reasonable as the two extremes, in fact, characterizations of behaviors
given by such updating are largely missing from the literature2. In other words, the preference
behaviors corresponding to such non-extreme updating rules have not been extensively studied
and identified.
In this paper, I propose a new updating rule, Relative Maximum Likelihood (RML) updating,
which takes the form of applying Bayes’ rule to a subset of the set of priors. The specific subset
is determined by a linear contraction of the set of priors towards its subset assigning a maximal
probability to the observed event. Consequently, RML is able to provide a means of intermediate
updating between FB and ML. As the degree of contraction varies, it captures the entire range of
attitudes towards discarding priors based on likelihood. As a result, FB and ML are included as
extreme special cases.
I provide foundations for RML updating when the preferences admit Maxmin Expected Utility
(MEU) representations (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), a leading theory of decision making un-
der ambiguity. Under MEU, the DM evaluates prospects according to the worst expected utility
generated by the set of priors.
For MEU preferences, Pires (2002) characterizes FB by a simple behavioral axiom. On the
other hand, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) axiomatizes ML when preference admit both MEU and
Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) representations, which is a strict special case of the MEU pref-
erences. Their axiomatization, however, does not extend to the more general case. In fact, there
has been no axiomatization of ML under general MEU preferences in the literature. The first main
result of this paper (Theorem 2.4 and more generally Theorem B.1) addresses this long-standing
open question by providing a characterization of ML for MEU preferences. Moreover, this result
1Some may also refer to it as prior-by-prior updating
2See section 6 for more detailed references.
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also proves to be instrumental for the characterization of RML.
RML is characterized by weakening the axioms leading to FB and ML. In turn, those axioms
are relaxations of the well-known dynamic consistency principle3. The characterization results not
only identify the behavioral foundations for the type of non-extreme updating specified by RML,
but they also suggest the common behavioral patterns under FB andML, two seemingly orthogonal
updating rules.
Motivated by these characterizations, in this paper, I further identify a key issue in the applica-
tions of ambiguity and showcase how RML can be applied to address it.
Many recent applications of the MEU model assume the players update according to FB4. In
settings such as mechanism design or information design, these applications find that the introduc-
tion of ambiguity is strictly beneficial for the principal. However, there is clearly a caveat that this
finding may hinge on the specific assumption of FB updating. RML, as a larger family of updating
rules including FB, provides a useful tool for examining this issue.
As an illustration, section 5 analyzes an example in the context of ambiguous persuasion stud-
ied by Beaucheˆne et al. (2019). In this example, they construct an ambiguous persuasion scheme
granting the sender strictly more payoff than the optimal Bayesian persuasion under the assump-
tion that the receiver uses FB updating. I first show that this scheme becomes strictly worse than
the optimal Bayesian persuasion whenever the receiver slightly deviates from FB in the direction
of ML. The level of such deviation can be easily captured by RML. This finding shows that the
particular construction used by Beaucheˆne et al. (2019) can be non-robust with respect to updating.
Nonetheless, I construct an alternative ambiguous persuasion scheme, under which the receiver
would behave exactly the same no matter what attitude he has towards discarding priors based on
likelihood5. Such a scheme is thus likelihood-robust. Furthermore, I show that the sender can do
strictly better using likelihood-robust ambiguous persuasion compared to Bayesian persuasion in
this example. In other words, the strict gain from using ambiguous strategies does not rely on the
specific assumption of FB updating in this case.
The remainder of the introduction gives the definition of RML updating and an overview of the
characterization results.
1.1 Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating
Let a closed and convex6 set C denote the set of priors over a state space Ω. For each conditioning
event E ⊆ Ω, let C∗(E) denote the subset of the set of priors assigning maximal probability to the
event E, i.e. C∗(E) ≡ argmax
p∈C
p(E).
Definition 1.1 (RML updating). Under RML updating, when the eventE occurs, each of the priors
in the set Cα(E) will be updated according to Bayes’ rule. Cα(E) is defined as in the following,
for some α ∈ [0, 1]:
Cα(E) ≡ αC
∗(E) + (1− α)C = {αp+ (1− α)q : p ∈ C∗(E) and q ∈ C}.
3See Ghirardato (2002) for an example.
4For example, Bose and Renou (2014), Kellner and Le Quement (2018) and Beaucheˆne et al. (2019)
5This applies to RML updating, but also to any updating rule discarding priors based on likelihood. An example of
such an updating rule not captured by RML is minimum likelihood updating where the receiver discard all the priors
not ascribing minimum probability to the observed event.
6Restricting the set of priors to be closed and convex is without loss of generality under MEU preferences.
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Namely, Cα(E) is an element-wise linear mixture of the two sets C
∗(E) and C. As C∗(E) ⊆
C, for all α ∈ [0, 1] one has C∗(E) ⊆ Cα(E) ⊆ C.
Geometrically, illustrated in Figure 1, the set Cα(E) is a linear contraction of the set C towards
C∗(E). In Figure 1, the triangle represents the simplex of probability distributions over three
states ω1, ω2 and ω3. The larger hexagon represents the set of priors C. For conditioning event
E = {ω1, ω2}, the bottom line of the hexagon represents C
∗(E). The blue shaded area represents
Cα(E) for some α ∈ [0, 1].
ω2
ω3
ω1
C
C∗({ω1, ω2})
Cα({ω1, ω2})
Figure 1: Graphical Illustration of Cα(E)
Observe that when α = 0, Cα(E) coincides with C and RML reduces to FB; when α = 1,
Cα(E) becomes C
∗(E) and RML reduces to ML. All the other α ∈ (0, 1) capture intermediate
behaviors between FB and ML. Moreover, the set Cα(E) shrinks as α increases, reflecting the
fact that a larger α corresponds to a DM being more willing to discard priors. In this sense, the
parameter α captures the inclination towards ML relative to FB.
To better illustrate how RML works and its relation with FB and ML, consider a version of
Ellsberg’s three-colored urn problem: An urn contains 30 red (R) balls and 60 other balls that can
be either black (B) or yellow (Y). Nature randomly draws a ball from the urn. Let Ω = {R,B, Y }
be the state space defined by the possible colors of the drawn ball. Suppose the DM’s preference
is represented by a set of priors coinciding with the information of the urn:
C = {p ∈ ∆({R,B, Y }) : p(R) = 1/3, 0 ≤ p(B) ≤ 2/3}
Then let E = {R,B} be the observed event, i.e. the DM later learns that the drawn ball is not
yellow. Under FB, the DM updates every prior in C conditional onE. In other words, she does not
discard any prior in her initial set of priors after learning this information. Then the DM applies
Bayes’ rule to C to get the following set of posteriors:
ΠC ≡ {p ∈ ∆({R,B}) : 1/3 ≤ p(R) ≤ 1}
Under ML, the maximal probability of eventE is ascribed by the prior p ∈ C such that p(B) =
2/3:
C∗(E) = {p ∈ ∆({R,B, Y }) : p(R) = 1/3, p(B) = 2/3}
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Namely, once the DM learns the drawn ball is not yellow, she further infers that there is no yellow
ball in this urn and discards all the priors assigning positive probability to the event that the drawn
ball is yellow. The set of posteriors under ML is then given by:
ΠC∗(E) ≡ {p ∈ ∆({R,B}) : p(R) = 1/3}
Under RML, for some α ∈ [0, 1], the updated set by definition is given by
Cα(E) = αC
∗(E) + (1− α)C
= {p ∈ ∆({R,B, Y }) : p(R) = 1/3, 2α/3 ≤ p(B) ≤ 2/3}
The set Cα(E) represents the DM’s inference upon learning the drawn ball is not yellow as the urn
is now believed to contain less than 60(1 − α) yellow balls. Notice that the maximum possible
number of yellow balls in this refined set is decreasing with respect to α. The set of posteriors
updated from this set is then:
ΠCα(E) ≡ {p ∈ ∆({R,B}) : 1/3 ≤ p(R) ≤ 1/(2α + 1)}
Intuitively, given the observed event {R,B}, the DM may infer that there cannot be too many
yellow balls in the urn, otherwise, such an event may not actually occur. Then a DM who is more
confident about this type of inference would be willing to make a sharper conclusion about the
possible number of yellow balls in the urn by discarding more priors. This results in a smaller
refined set of priors. In this sense, the parameter α calibrates exactly the extent of willingness to
discard priors based on likelihood.
1.2 Two Representation Theorems
The central contribution of this paper is identifying the axioms that characterize conditional pref-
erences generated by RML updating. In particular, I provide two different representation theorems
that differ in the extent to which the parameter α is allowed to vary across events (Theorem 3.3,
Theorem 3.4).
Theorem 3.3 characterizes conditional preferences generated by RML updating when the pa-
rameter α is allowed to vary across events. Formally, the conditional preference upon observing
event E is represented by the set of posteriors given by RML updating with parameter α[E]. I
call this form of conditional preference is represented by the Contingent RML updating. Namely,
contingent on different events, the specific RML updating rule being applied might differ.
In contrast, Theorem 3.4 characterizes conditional preferences given by RML updating with
the same parameter α across all the events. This simply requires adding an axiom to the character-
ization of Contingent RML updating.
Both representation theorems are important in their own right. A constant α can be more
convenient for applications as it provides a sharper prediction of updating behaviors. On the other
hand, a parameter α[E] varying across events allows for more flexibility in terms of incorporating
updating behavior.
For example, some experimental results in Liang (2019) can be interpreted from the perspec-
tive of Contingent RML updating. The results in Table 4.2 therein correspond with a conditional
preference represented by Contingent RML updating with α[E] < 1/2whenE =“good news” and
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α[E] > 1/2 when E =“bad news”. Details of this observation can be found in section 4. In the
same section, I provide a full list of behavioral predictions that RML and Contingent RML are able
to offer in this specific environment studied by Liang (2019) and some other recent experimental
papers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 setups the environment and
provides a characterization of ML updating. Section 3 is the main section, which gives the formal
definition of preferences represented by Contingent RML and RML updating, and also provides the
foundations for them. Section 4 looks at a special environment with ambiguous signals and illus-
trates the predictions and interpretations that Contingent RML and RML are able to offer. Section
5 applies RML to the example of ambiguous persuasion and addresses the issue of robustness to
updating. Section 6 talks about a connection between RML updating and a relative likelihood ratio
test and also the related literature. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are collected in appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Set up
Let Ω be the set of states with at least three elements7, endowed with a sigma-algebra Σ of events.
Denote a generic event by E. Let X be the set of all simple (i.e. finite-support) lotteries over a set
of consequences Z and let x denote a generic element ofX . Let F denote the set of bounded acts,
meaning that each f ∈ F is a bounded Σ-measurable function from Ω to X . With conventional
abuse of notation, denote a constant act which maps all states ω ∈ Ω to x simply by x.
The primitive is a family of preferences {%E}E∈Σ over all acts f ∈ F . Let %Ω≡% denote the
ex-ante preference. For all the other non-empty E ∈ Σ, let %E denote the conditional preference
when event E occurs.
First of all, assume that the ex-ante preference % admits a Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU)
representation, i.e. it is represented by a closed and convex set C ⊆ ∆(Ω) and an affine utility
function u such that for all f, g ∈ F :
f % g ⇔ min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(f)dp ≥ min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(g)dp
where u(f) denotes a random variable Y : Ω → R such that Y (ω) = u(f(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Denote the ex-ante evaluation of an act f according to this MEU representation by U(f). In
addition, assume that C is a polytope in the space ∆(Ω) meaning it has finitely many extreme
points8.
The finitely many extreme points assumption is extremely useful as it helps simplify the state-
ments of the axioms to a great extent meanwhile conveying the same intuitions. All characteriza-
tions can be achieved without this assumption by similar axioms as shown in appendix B. On the
other hand, this assumption is also arguably reasonable as it still covers a large number of popular
cases of multiple priors, for example the ǫ-contamination.
7When there are only two states, the conditional preferences are trivial.
8This assumption is studied in Siniscalchi (2006). Under his terminology, it says that the preference can be repre-
sented by finitely many plausible priors.
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Assume that X is unbounded from above under the ex-ante preference9. Namely, u(X) =
{u(x) : x ∈ X} is unbounded from above. Without loss of generality, normalize u(·) such that
u(X) = (u,∞) for some u ∈ R<0 ∪ {−∞}.
For each E ∈ Σ, for any f, h ∈ F , let fEh denote an act mapping all ω ∈ E to f(ω) and all
ω ∈ Ec to h(ω). An event E is %-null if for all f, g, h ∈ F , one has fEh ∼ gEh. Under MEU, an
event E is %-null if and only if p(E) = 0 for all p ∈ C. Thus, E is%-nonnull if there exists p ∈ C
such that p(E) > 0.
Furthermore, define an event E to be strict %-nonnull if for all x, x′ ∈ X such that x ≻ x′, one
has xEx
′ ≻ x′. Under MEU, an event E is strict %-nonnull if and only if p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ C.
Therefore, an event E is %-nonnull but is not strict %-nonnull if there exists p, p′ ∈ C such that
p(E) = 0 and p′(E) > 0.
For each %-nonnull E ∈ Σ, assume that the conditional preference %E also admits a MEU
representation. It is represented by a set CE ⊆ ∆(Ω) and the same utility function u such that for
all f, g ∈ F :
f %E g ⇔ min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(f)dp ≥ min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(g)dp
Meanwhile, the conditional preference %E for %-null E is unrestricted.
Finally, assume that the conditional preferences satisfy consequentialism: first, for all p ∈ CE,
p(E) = 1, i.e. the complement of the conditioning event is irrelevant for the conditional pref-
erence; and second, ex-ante preference and conditioning event E completely determine the con-
ditional preference %E , which rules out the possibility that the updating rule may depend on the
context of decision problems (e.g. the menu of available acts).
All properties assumed for the primitive have axiomatize foundations:
• Maxmin Expected Utility representation: axioms from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
• C has finitely many extreme points: no local hedging axiom from Siniscalchi (2006).
• X is unbounded from above: unboundedness axiom from Maccheroni et al. (2006)
• u is independent of E: state independence axiom from Pires (2002) or unchanged tastes
axiom from Hanany and Klibanoff (2007).
• Consequentialism: null complement axiom and the independence axioms in section 3.2 of
Hanany and Klibanoff (2007).
Setting up in this way allows me to establish a clear equivalence between the key axioms
relating the conditional preferences to the ex-ante preference and the updating rules. Hence the
key behavioral foundations characterizing different updating rules under MEU preferences can be
highlighted in the representation theorems.
9It suffices to assumeX to be unbounded, however ifX is unbounded from below, the axioms need to modified in
order to accommodate such a case. For simplicity, this paper assumes it away.
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2.2 Full Bayesian Updating
For dynamic choices, the well-known dynamic consistency principle relate the conditional prefer-
ences to the ex-ante preference in two different directions (see Ghirardato (2002) for an example).
To further distinguish between these two directions, they will be referred to separately as Contin-
gent Reasoning (CR) and Dynamic Consistency (DC) in this paper10:
Axiom CR (Contingent Reasoning).
For all f, h ∈ F and x ∈ X , if f ∼E x then fEh ∼ xEh.
Axiom DC (Dynamic Consistency).
For all f, h ∈ F and x ∈ X , if fEh ∼ xEh then f ∼E x.
Intuitively, CR emphasizes that the ex-ante preference could be recovered by considering con-
ditional preferences contingent on whether or not the event E occurs. Namely, the ex-ante com-
parison between the acts fEh and xEh could be done by the following procedure: contingent on
event E occurring, the DM is conditionally indifferent. On the other hand, contingent on E not
occurring, she receives exactly the same thing. Thus, she further concludes that she is indifferent
ex-ante.
DC emphasizes the other direction, that the conditional preference should be consistent with
the ex-ante preference when it does not matter what pays on the event Ec. In other words, if two
acts only differ within the event E, then the DM’s ex-ante comparison should remain the same
after learning event E occurring.
As MEU preferences violate Savage’s P2 (sure thing principle), whether or not the statement
fEh ∼ xEh is true would also depend on the act h. As a result, it is no longer meaningful to state
CR and DC in terms of all the acts, as a different h may result in a different conclusion. Instead,
the claims about CR and DC should also specify under which act it holds.
For example, a consequence x ∈ X is said to be the conditional certainty equivalent of an
act f given event E if x ∼E f . Consider the following statement of CR, in which the act h is
explicitly fixed to be the conditional certainty equivalent:
Axiom CR-C (Contingent Reasoning given Conditional certainty equivalent).
For all f ∈ F and x ∈ X , if f ∼E x, then fEx ∼ x.
CR-C is exactly the A9 axiom in Pires (2002) and FB updating is defined in Pires (2002) by
the following11:
Definition 2.1 (FB). The primitive {%E}E∈Σ is represented by FB updating if the following holds
10The statements of the axioms are equivalent to the statements of dynamic consistency adopted by Ghirardato
(2002).
11The definition of FB restricts behaviors only for strict%-nonnull events. It is because for events that are%-nonnull
but not strict%-nonnull, there exists p ∈ C such that p(E) = 0, which cannot be updated via Bayes’ rule. Pires (2002)
shows, in those cases, her axioms are not able to pin down the exact conditional preferences. Notice that, such a
problem does not apply to RML when α 6= 0, since p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ Cα(E) even when E is not strict %-nonnull.
Yet for uniformity, I impose the same restriction to all characterizations.
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for all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ F :
min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(f)dp = min
p∈C
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
.
Under the current framework, her representation theorem can be simplified to the following:
Theorem 2.2 (Pires, 2002). {%E}E∈Σ is represented by FB updating if and only if CR-C holds for
all strict %-nonnull events E ∈ Σ.
This theorem highlights that CR-C is the key behavioral foundation for FB updating under
MEU preferences.
2.3 Maximum Likelihood Updating
Another popular updating rule for MEU preferences is the Maximum Likelihood (ML) updating
rule proposed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). The conditional preferences represented by ML
updating are defined as in the following:
Definition 2.3 (ML). The primitive {%E}E∈Σ is represented by ML updating if the following holds
for all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ F :
min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(f)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
where C∗(E) = argmax
p∈C
p(E).
Namely, the conditional preference %E for strict %-nonnull E is represented by the set of
posteriors that were updated from the subset of the set of priors assigning a maximal probability to
the observed event E.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) provide an axiomatic characterization of ML updating when the
preferences admit both MEU and CEU representations. This class of preferences is a strict subset
of preferences admitting MEU representations.
In that case, it is without loss of generality to let X be bounded and denote the best conse-
quence inX by x∗. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) show that ML is characterized by the following
axiom:
Axiom CR-B (Contingent Reasoning given Best consequence).
For all f ∈ F and x ∈ X , if f ∼E x, then fEx
∗ ∼ xEx
∗.
CR-B claims that, the DM’s ex-ante evaluation of the act fEx
∗ can be recovered by applying
contingent reasoning with respect to the event E. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) offer a “pes-
simistic” interpretation of this behavior: the DM’s conditional preference of an act f comes from
the consideration that the best consequence would have been received had the complement event
happened. In other words, her conditional evaluation of the act f reflects a disappointment that
event E actually occurs. Under MEU preferences, the best consequence is believed to be received
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only with the minimum probability ex-ante. Consequently, the disappointment reflected in the
conditional preference is in accordance with such an ex-ante belief.
As one enlarges the domain of preferences to the more general case of MEU. Although this
intuition may sill seem to be applicable, the exact intuition captured by CR-B becomes imprecise.
The following example illustrates a case where the ex-ante preference admits MEU but not CEU
representation, and CR-B is violated under ML updating:
Example 1. Consider a state space Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, denote any p ∈ ∆(Ω) by a vector with three
coordinates p = (p1, p2, p3) such that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1. Let set C ⊆ ∆(Ω) be the closed convex
hull of the following three points: (1/2, 0, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 1/2) and (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Let X = [0, 1] with utility function u(x) = x. Consider an act f pays one at ω1, zero at ω2 and
is undetermined on state ω3. Let the conditioning event E be the following set: {ω1, ω2}.
First of all, one can verify that a MEU preference represented by this C does not admit a CEU
representation12. If the conditional preference is given by ML updating, as C∗(E) contains only
the extreme point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), it implies that
f ∼E 1/2
CR-B claims that fEx
∗ should be ex-ante indifferent to 1/2Ex
∗ for x∗ = 1. However, it is actually
the case that
fE1 ≺ 1/2E1
i.e. CR-B is false.
One might notice that the breakdown of CR-B results from the fact that fE1 and 1/2E1 are
evaluated at different extreme points under MEU. Especially, the act fE1 is not evaluated at the
extreme point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Namely, her ex-ante evaluation of the act fE1 is not given by the
prior assigning a maximal probability to the event E. Moreover, the graphical illustration given in
figure 2 suggests that it is exactly because the consequence x∗ = 1 is not good enough.
ω2
ω3
ω1
(1/2, 0, 1/2) (0, 1/2, 1/2)
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
fω1,ω21
fω1,ω22
Figure 2: Graphical Illustration of Example 1
In figure 2, the arrow indicates how the indifference curve of act fω1,ω2x under expected util-
ity would be changing (in angle) if one increases the value of consequence x. When x = 1,
12This C is not a core of any convex capacity.
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the act fω1,ω21 is evaluated at the extreme point (0, 1/2, 1/2) according to MEU. When x = 2,
the act fω1,ω22 is evaluated at the segment between the two extreme points (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and
(0, 1/2, 1/2). If one keeps increasing x, apparently for all x ≥ 2, the act fω1,ω2x will be evaluated
at the extreme point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (When x goes to infinity, the act eventually will be parallel to
the bottom line of this triangle).
Therefore, for this act f and conditioning event E = {ω1, ω2}, the consequence x paid on the
event Ec needs to be at least better than x = 2 for the ex-ante evaluation of it to be given by some
prior assigning a maximal probability to E. Consequently, the assumption that X is bounded by
x∗ = 1 would prevent that from happening. In fact, one can also verify that fEx ∼ 1/2Ex for all
x ≥ 2 in this example.
In summary, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993)’s intuition about the behavioral foundation of ML
updating is qualitatively correct, i.e. the conditional evaluation of an act f given by ML reflects
a disappointment that event E occurs while some sufficiently good consequence would have been
paid had event E not occur. However, under general MEU, the best consequence x∗ sometimes is
not good enough. Example 1 shows exactly a case where the threshold (x = 2) for sufficiently
good consequence is strictly better than the upper bound (x∗ = 1). Furthermore, notice that this
threshold depends on the act being considered as well. Obviously, when f pays 2 at ω1 and 0 at
ω2, the threshold will become x = 4. Hence, to accommodate all these findings, X needs to be
unbounded from above.
In fact, the behavioral foundation of ML updating under MEU is more precisely that for all
acts there exists a threshold of sufficiently good consequence such that CR holds. Formally,
Axiom CR-S (Contingent Reasoning given Sufficiently good consequences).
For all f ∈ F there exists x¯E,f ∈ X such that, for all x, x
∗ ∈ X with x∗ % x¯E,f , if f ∼E x,
then fEx
∗ ∼ xEx
∗.
For the necessity of CR-S under ML updating, the existence of the threshold x¯E,f for every
E and f is guaranteed by assumptions on the primitives: X is unbounded from above and C has
finitely many extreme points.
The reason whyX being unbounded from above is necessary has been explained. For the other
assumption, when C contains infinitely many extreme points, for example, it is a circle in the three-
dimensional simplex. Consider the act f in example 1. fEx is evaluated at the prior assigning a
maximal probability to the event E only if x goes to infinity. In that case, a finite threshold x¯E,f
will not exist. In contrast, when C contains finitely many extreme points, such a threshold always
exists13.
The following theorem shows that CR-S is the key behavioral foundation for ML updating
under MEU:
Theorem 2.4 (ML). {%E}E∈Σ is represented by ML updating if and only if CR-S holds for all
strict %-nonnull events E ∈ Σ.
In appendix B, I provide an axiomatization of ML without the finitely many extreme points
assumption. The alternative axiom there accommodates the possibility that a finite threshold x¯E,f
13Proved by Lemma A.3.
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may not exist. In the case of non-existence, it suffices to consider a sequence of increasing thresh-
olds such that the difference between fEx
∗ and xEx
∗ vanishes for all x∗ better than the threshold.
The formal characterization is given by Theorem B.1.
3 Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating
3.1 Representations
Recall Definition 1.1, RML updating applies Bayes’ rule to the following subset of the set of priors
C for some α ∈ [0, 1]:
Cα(E) ≡ αC
∗(E) + (1− α)C = {αp+ (1− α)q : p ∈ C∗(E) and q ∈ C}
As RML features a parameter representing the extent of inclination towards ML relative to
FB, it creates the possibility that a DM may not have the same inclination across different events.
However, this is impossible under either FB or ML, as the parameters in those cases, by definition,
are fixed to be a constant (α ≡ 0 or 1).
For this reason, two definitions for conditional preferences generated by RML updating dif-
fer in the extent to which the parameter α is allowed to vary across events are provided. The
weaker definition captures the case in which the conditional preferences are updated by RML with
parameter α[E]. In this case, α[E] explicitly depends on the observed event E capturing the dif-
ferent inclinations across events. Such conditional preferences are defined to be represented by the
Contingent RML updating:
Definition 3.1 (Contingent RML). The primitive {%E}E∈Σ is represented by Contingent RML
updating if for all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ there exists α[E] ∈ [0, 1] such that for all f ∈ F :
min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(f)dp = min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
where Cα[E](E) ≡ α[E]C
∗(E) + (1− α[E])C.
By definition, Contingent RML does not require a DM to have a consistent updating rule across
events. For example, it allows for the following updating behavior. A DM updates her belief
according to FB updating (α[E] = 0) for some event E. Meanwhile, she updates according to ML
updating (α[E ′] = 1) for another event E ′.
Such inconsistency may be caused by the different maximal or minimal probability of events,
different contexts, or even just different labels of events. Although one can argue whether this
kind of consistency in updating is desirable or not, by offering such flexibility, Contingent RML is
able to accommodate a broader class of behaviors. Particularly, some experimental evidence also
reflects such inconsistency14.
On the other hand, undoubtedly, Contingent RML may not be strong enough in applications
when sharper predictions of a DM’s updating behaviors are needed. For example, in the case where
14See discussion in section 4.
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a DM’s conditional preference is observed only under one of the events. Without a constant pa-
rameter α, the analyst cannot draw any meaningful conclusion about this DM’s updating behavior
under the other events.
Therefore, the stronger definition captures exactly the case in which the conditional prefer-
ences are updated from RML with the same parameter α across all the events. Such conditional
preferences will simply be defined to be represented by RML updating:
Definition 3.2 (RML). The primitive {%E}E∈Σ is represented by RML updating if there exists
α ∈ [0, 1] such that for all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ and for all f ∈ F :
min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(f)dp = min
p∈Cα(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
where Cα(E) ≡ αC
∗(E) + (1− α)C.
3.2 Preference Foundation
Clearly, RML is a more general class of updating rules that includes both FB and ML as special
cases. Hence, the set of conditional preferences generated by RML is also a superset of the condi-
tional preferences admitting FB or ML updating. Consequently, the axioms characterizing FB or
ML may sometimes be violated by this larger set of conditional preferences. The characterization
provided in this paper help pin down exactly the relaxations of those axioms to accommodate these
behaviors.
Recall that FB is characterized by CR-C (f ∼E x implies fEx ∼ x). Meanwhile, it is imme-
diate that FB also satisfies DC-C: fEx ∼ x implies f ∼E x. Moreover, DC-C can be equivalently
written as15:
Axiom DC-C (Dynamic Consistency given Conditional certainty equivalent).
For all f, g ∈ F and for all x ∈ X with x ∼E f , if fEx ∼ gEx, then f ∼E g.
Notice that the quantifier x ∼E f is simply a definition of the constant act x needed for the
statement of this axiom. The existence of such an x for any act f under the conditional preference
is guaranteed by the MEU representation.
Similarly, ML is characterized by CR-S (f ∼E x implies fEx
∗ ∼ xEx
∗ for all x∗ % x¯E,f ).
It also satisfies DC-S: fEx
∗ ∼ xEx
∗ for all x∗ % x¯E,f implies f ∼E x, which can further be
equivalently written as:
Axiom DC-S (Dynamic Consistency given Sufficiently good consequences).
For all f, g ∈ F there exists x¯E,f,g ∈ X such that, for all x
∗ ∈ X with x∗ % x¯E,f,g, if
fEx
∗ ∼ gEx
∗, then f ∼E g.
15To see why they are equivalent, the necessity of the original statement of DC-C is immediate by letting f to be a
constant act, i.e. f = x. For sufficiency, first notice that for each f there exists xf such that fExf ∼ xf holds: There
exists x and x such that fEx % x and fEx ≺ x, meanwhile U(fEx) is continuous and increasing in x. Then the
original DC-C implies f ∼E xf . For any g with fExf ∼ gExf ∼ xf , the last indifference further implies g ∼E xf
by the original DC-C.
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The characterization of conditional preferences generated by RML updating relies on weak-
ening exactly these four axioms: CR-C, CR-S, DC-C, and DC-S. In other words, all the axioms
characterizing RML restrict behaviors only when the act pays on the complement eventEc is either
the conditional certainty equivalent or any of the sufficiently good consequences.
Consider the following two axioms:
Axiom CR-UO (Contingent Reasoning with Undershooting and Overshooting).
For all f ∈ F and x ∈ X there exists x¯E,f ∈ X such that, for all x
∗ ∈ X with x∗ % x¯E,f , if
f ∼E x, then (i) fEx - x and (ii) fEx
∗ % xEx
∗.
Axiom DC-CS (Dynamic Consistency given Conditional certainty equivalent and Sufficient
good consequences).
For all f, g ∈ F there exists x¯E,f,g ∈ X such that, for all x, x
∗ ∈ X with x ∼E f and
x∗ % x¯E,f,g, if (i) fEx ∼ gEx and (ii) fEx
∗ ∼ gEx
∗, then f ∼E g.
Notice that CR-UO is a relaxation of CR-C and CR-S, whereas DC-CS is a relaxation of DC-C
and DC-S. However, the relaxations take different forms.
CR-UO keeps the common premise of CR-C and CR-S (f ∼E x) but relaxes the conclusion of
the two axioms. Instead of implying indifferences, CR-UO claims that only weak inequalities in
term of the ex-ante preference can be concluded. Namely, the ex-ante preference recovered by CR
is either undershooting or overshooting.
DC-CS keeps the common conclusion of DC-C and DC-S (f ∼E g) but strengthens the premise
by requiring the premises of both DC-C and DC-S to hold. In other words, DC can be concluded
only when both ex-ante indifferences hold, which is a stronger requirement than either DC-C or
DC-S.
Before providing intuitions for the two axioms, the following theorem claims that these two
axioms are indeed the key behavioral foundations for Contingent RML updating (as none of the
axioms restrict behaviors across events):
Theorem 3.3 (Contingent RML). {%E}E∈Σ is represented by Contingent RML if and only if CR-
UO and DC-CS hold for all strict %-nonnull events E ∈ Σ. Furthermore for every such E, α[E]
is unique if there exists p, p′ ∈ C s.t. p(E) 6= p′(E).
For a very high-level intuition, CR-UO suggests that the updating rule needs to update some
intermediate set C(E) such that C∗(E) ⊆ C(E) ⊆ C. Given this restriction, DC-CS further pins
down the set C(E) to be exactly the functional form given by RML with some α[E].
To be more specific, notice that if the DM does not want to behave as extreme as either FB or
ML and update some set C(E) such that C∗(E) ⊆ C(E) ⊆ C. Her conditional evaluation of any
act f would be weakly higher than under FB and weakly lower than under ML. Let x, xFB and
xML denote the conditional certainty equivalent of an act f under different updating rules, then
one has xML % x % xFB .
First, notice that CR-C implies fEx
FB ∼ xFB . If one replaces xFB by x on both sides of this
indifference, x % xFB would further imply fEx - x. This is because the better consequence x is
received only on event Ec on the left hand side, yet it will be received in all states on the right hand
side. Thus the increase in terms of utility is higher on the right hand side, i.e. fEx - x.
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Intuitively, this DM’s ex-ante comparison between the acts fEx and x can no longer be recov-
ered exactly from contingent reasoning. Instead, because she discards some priors for conditional
evaluation of the act f , her ex-ante evaluation of fEx would be undershooting, meaning that she
is now only confident in the fact that fEx should be weakly worse than x.
On the other hand, as CR-S implies fEx
∗ ∼ xMLE x
∗ for all sufficiently large x∗, replacing
xML by the worse consequence x would imply that fEx
∗ % xEx
∗. Similarly, the DM’s ex-ante
comparison between fEx
∗ and xEx
∗ cannot be recovered exactly by contingent reasoning as well.
Since now her conditional evaluation of the act f depends on more priors than under ML, her ex-
ante evaluation of fEx
∗ would be overshooting. It means that instead of knowing that she should
be indifferent, now she is only confident that fEx
∗ should be weakly better than xEx
∗.
From the above discussion, CR-UO captures exactly the intuition about a DM who is not will-
ing to be as extreme as either FB or ML. However, the axiom per se does not bring anything more
than that. Actually, it is not hard to show that the CR-UO axiom is equivalent to updating any
intermediate set C(E)16. Therefore, to further pin down a specific set to represent the DM’s con-
ditional preference, more restrictions need to impose on the DM’s behaviors.
DC-CS restricts the DM’s conditional preferences by imposingDCwhen the ex-ante preference
satisfies both fEx ∼ gEx and fEx
∗ ∼ gEx
∗. Notice that, under MEU preferences, these two
indifferences do not always hold at the same time. Instead, it is actually quite demanding for two
acts to be indifferent in both cases. In other words, under DC-CS, the DM concludes that she is
conditionally indifferent between the two acts f and g, only if they are sufficiently similar in the
sense that she finds f and g to be indifferent in both types of ex-ante comparisons.
Therefore, DC-CS itself is not a strong requirement on preferences, since it restricts behaviors
only when this rather strong premise is true. Nonetheless, it is sufficient to pin down the functional
form of conditional preferences, which is given exactly by the Contingent RML.
In the following, I am going to provide a sketch of the proof of this result:
Sketch of proof of Theorem 3.3. For sufficiency of CR-UO and DC-CS, fix any strict %-nonnull
E ∈ Σ, the proof proceeds by the following four steps:
Step 1. For any f ∈ F , find any x∗ that is better than the following three thresholds: (i) x, (ii)
x¯E,f and (iii) xˆE,f , where xˆE,f denotes the consequence such that for all x
∗ % xˆE,f one has
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
Fix such an x∗, CR-UO implies that fEx
∗ % xEx
∗ % x % fEx. Then it can be easily seen from
Figure 3 that there always exists an α[E, f ] ∈ [0, 1] such that the following equation holds:
α[E, f ]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(fEx) = α[E, f ]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(x) (3.1)
Furthermore, this α[E, f ] is unique if either fEx ≺ x or fEx
∗ ≻ xEx
∗ holds.
16The proof of this statement relies on a separating hyperplane argument, similar to the proof of Proposition 12 in
Hanany and Klibanoff (2007).
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U(fEx)
U(x)
U(fEx
∗)
U(xEx
∗)
α[E, f ]
Figure 3: Graphical Illustration of Step 1
Step 2. Fix any f ∈ F such that α[E, f ] is unique (if it does not exist then α[E] is not unique).
First, show that for the act fλy = λf + (1 − λ)y with any λ ∈ (0, 1] and y ∈ X , one has
α[E, fλy] = α[E, f ]. Namely, α[E, f ] is unchanged under the transformation of f by taking
mixtures with constant acts. This is given by equation (3.1) and the certainty independence axiom
in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Then for any act g ∈ F that cannot be obtained by taking mixtures of f with constant acts,
show that there always exists such transformations of f and g that the pair of transformed acts
satisfies the premises of DC-CS.
Step 3. Given the pair of transformed acts satisfying the premises of DC-CS. DC-CS further
implies that α[E, f ] needs to be equal to α[E, g]. Since the construction in step 2 works for
arbitrary g ∈ F , it thus concludes that α[E, f ] needs to be a constant across all f ∈ F . In other
words, equation (3.1) holds with α[E] independent of f :
α[E]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E])U(x) = α[E]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E])U(x) (3.2)
Step 4. By plugging into each term in equation (3.2), the DM’s conditional evaluation of any
act f ∈ F can be shown to be represented by
min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
i.e. it is represented by RML updating with α[E].
Theorem 3.3 shows that CR-UO and DC-CS characterize conditional preferences that are given
by the Contingent RML updating rule where the parameter α[E] may be different across events.
Clearly, it is because both CR-UO and DC-CS restrict behaviors only within each conditioning
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event E, yet does not explicitly restrict behaviors across events. Notice that imposing either CR-C
or CR-S for all events actually also restricts behaviors across events, since the resulting updating
rule takes the form α[E] ≡ 0 or α[E] ≡ 1. However, the two axioms characterizing the Contingent
RML do not have this additional power.
To further restrict behaviors across events, consider the following axiom. It features a similar
statement as DC-CS but across different events E1 and E2:
Axiom EC (Event Consistency).
For all f, g ∈ F and E1, E2 ∈ Σ there exists x¯E1,E2,f,g ∈ X such that, for all x, x
∗
1, x
∗
2 ∈ X
with x ∼E1 f , x
∗
1 % x¯E1,E2,f,g, x
∗
2 % x¯E1,E2,f,g and xE1x
∗
1 ∼ xE2x
∗
2, if (i) fE1x ∼ gE2x and (ii)
fE1x
∗
1 ∼ gE2x
∗
2, then g ∼E2 x.
First, notice that EC is also a relaxation of DC-C and DC-S, since under DC-C, the first premise
implies g ∼E2 x, and under DC-S, the second premise implies g ∼E2 x. It is a relaxation of DC-C
and DC-S different from the relaxation in DC-CS. In particular, EC and DC-CS are orthogonal in
the sense that they do not imply each other.
EC, as suggested by its name, uses constant acts to calibrate the conditional preferences. More
specifically, two acts have the same conditional certainty equivalent, one under events E1 and the
other under E2, if they are indifferent under the ex-ante preference when some specific act is paid
on Ec1 and E
c
2 respectively. The behavioral intuition of DC-CS can be adapted here to provide a
similar explanation for this axiom.
The following theorem shows that EC achieves exactly its goal: calibrating a constant α to
represent conditional preferences that are given by RML updating:
Theorem 3.4 (RML). {%E}E∈Σ is represented by RML if and only if CR-UO, DC-CS and EC
hold for all strict %-nonnull events E ∈ Σ. Furthermore, α is unique if there exists such an E that
p(E) 6= p′(E) for some p, p′ ∈ C.
4 Updating Ambiguous Signals
In this paper, the state space Ω is the grand state space, which could include both payoff-relevant
states and payoff-irrelevant signals. To facilitate discussions, in this section, Ω will be explicitly
written as the Cartesian product of states and signals: Θ× S with generic element θ× s. Then the
event in which signal s realizes is given by E = Θ× s.
Given a set of priors C ⊆ ∆(Θ×S), its marginal distribution over the states17 Θ is ambiguous
if there exists p, p′ ∈ C such that p(A × S) 6= p′(A × S) for some A × S ∈ Σ. Conversely, it is
probabilistic over the states if p(A × S) = p′(A × S) for all A × S ∈ Σ and p, p′ ∈ C. In the
latter case, ambiguity could only arise through the signals. This section illustrates the implications
of Contingent RML and RML in this special environment.
Though special, this environment has been adopted in various applications, for example, Bose and Renou
(2014), Beaucheˆne et al. (2019), Kellner and Le Quement (2018). In addition, several recent ex-
perimental papers also focus on understanding subjects’ response to ambiguous signals when
17I will refer payoff-relevant states as simply states hereafter, as it should cause no confusion.
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there is no other source of ambiguity, for example, Liang (2019), Shishkin and Ortoleva (2019),
Kellner et al. (2019). Therefore, understanding the implications of RML in this specific environ-
ment will be helpful not only for the comparison with other updating rules, but also for illustrating
the theoretical contributions of RML for future applications.
In the following, I will use a stylized example to illustrate the theoretical predictions RML is
able to offer here.
Example 2. There are two payoff-relevant states: Θ = {θ1, θ2} with unambiguous marginal prior
p(θ1) = β ∈ [0, 1]. The DM is evaluating a bet f that pays one at θ1 and nothing at θ2. There are
two signals: S = {s1, s2} and the signaling structure is ambiguous, meaning that there are two
possible correlations between signals and states:
p(si|θi) = λ1
p(si|θi) = λ2
and which correlation generates the signal is unknown. Without loss of generality, assume (λ1 +
λ2)/2 ≥ 1/2 and λ1 ≥ λ2. Namely, the signal s1 is “on average” an informative signal for the
state θ1. Moreover, the first signaling device governed by λ1 is more accurate than λ2.
Suppose the DM’s preference is represented by a set of priors coinciding exactly with the in-
formation given in this example. Her set of priors C can be easily parameterized by a parameter
µ ∈ [0, 1] denoting the probability that the first signaling device governed by λ1 is the one gen-
erating the signals. Namely, C = {pµ ∈ ∆(Θ × S) : µ ∈ [0, 1]} where pµ is defined as in the
following:
pµ(θ1 × {s1, s2}) = β
pµ(θ2 × {s1, s2}) = 1− β
pµ(θ1 × s1) = β[µ · λ1 + (1− µ) · λ2]
pµ(θ2 × s1) = (1− β)[µ · (1− λ1) + (1− µ) · (1− λ2)]
pµ({θ1, θ2} × s1) = pµ(θ1 × s1) + pµ(θ2 × s1)
To fully characterize the DM’s behavior in this example, there are in total six different cases:
β > 1/2, β = 1/2 and β < 1/2 combined with signal realization s1 or s2. Only one of the
cases will be derived here in detail and a summary of behaviors in all these cases will be provided
afterwards in Table 1.
Consider the case β > 1/2 and signal s1 is realized. Notice that when β > 1/2, the likelihood
of signal s1, given by pµ({θ1, θ2} × s1) is maximized when µ = 1. Moreover, thanks to the simple
parametrization of the set C, for any α ∈ [0, 1] the set Cα({θ1, θ2} × s1) is given by
Cα({θ1, θ2} × s1) = {pµ ∈ C : µ ∈ [α, 1]}
Under RML, the DM updates only the priors pµ for µ ∈ [α, 1] and for each pµ the posterior about
states after observing s1 is given by
πµ(θ1|s1) ≡
pµ(θ1 × s1)
pµ({θ1, θ2} × s1)
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Therefore, the DM’s set of posteriors will be the following interval18: [πα(θ1|s1), π1(θ1|s1)].
Clearly, under FB, the DM’s set of posteriors will be [π0(θ1|s1), π1(θ1|s1)], and under ML, the DM
will end up with a single posterior: π1(θ1|s1).
Furthermore under MEU, the DM’s conditional evaluation of the bet f will be given by the
lowest posterior of state s1. Let x
FB
f , x
RML
f and x
ML
f denote the conditional certainty equivalent of
the bet f under FB, RML and ML updating. Then one has xFBf ≤ x
RML
f ≤ x
ML
f for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Especially, xRMLf is increasing with respect to α and coincides with x
FB
f and x
ML
f when α = 0 and
α = 1 respectively.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of behaviors under RML in all six cases. The first two rows
are the only cases where the DM’s evaluation of f depends on the value of α. In other words, those
are the cases where different updating rules affect one’s conditional evaluation of f . Thus, RML
is able to provide richer predictions than FB and ML.
The third and fourth row are the cases where theMEU evaluation of f is given by the posteriors
updated from the maximum likelihood priors. Thus, even though the updated beliefs are different
under FB and ML, MEU makes their evaluations the same. For this reason, although the updated
belief under RML is also different from FB and ML for any α ∈ (0, 1), the MEU evaluation under
RML is still the same.
Finally, the fifth and sixth rows represent the same type of special case where every prior agrees
on the likelihood of every signal. It is the case where FB coincides with ML, and therefore RML
does not have an extra bite. All the priors will be updated under RML for all α ∈ [0, 1], thus the
updated belief will always be the same.
β Signal ML prior Evaluation Comparison with
of f probabilistic signal
α < 1/2: lower
> 1/2 s1 µ = 1 πα(θ1|s1) α = 1/2: equal
α > 1/2: higher
α < 1/2: lower
> 1/2 s2 µ = 0 πα(θ1|s2) α = 1/2: equal
α > 1/2: higher
< 1/2 s1 µ = 0 π0(θ1|s1) All α: lower
< 1/2 s2 µ = 1 π1(θ1|s2) All α: lower
= 1/2 s1 All µ π0(θ1|s1) All α: lower
= 1/2 s2 All µ π1(θ1|s2) All α: lower
Table 1: Summary of Example 2 under RML
The last column of Table 1 presents a comparison highlighted in experiments by Liang (2019).
It compares the DM’s s conditional evaluations of f under this ambiguous signaling structure with
a probabilistic signaling structure where the correlation equals to (λ1+λ2)/2. The latter is designed
to reflect an average accuracy of the two signaling devices in the ambiguous signaling structure.
For probabilistic signals, the DM simply follows Bayesian updating.
In the case where s1 is realized, notice that the DM’s posterior under the probabilistic signaling
structure is exactly given by π1/2(θ1|s1). Therefore, for β ≤ 1/2, the DM’s conditional evaluation
18Notice that piµ(θ1|s1) is increasing in µ.
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under ambiguous signal is always lower than her conditional evaluation under probabilistic signal.
On the other hand, when β > 1/2, this comparison will depend on the value of α. More specifi-
cally, α < 1/2 implies that the conditional evaluation under ambiguous signal is lower, α > 1/2
implies that the conditional evaluation under ambiguous signal is higher, and α = 1/2 implies they
are the same. Thus, from the perspective of RML, this type of comparison sometimes actually
reflects the DM’s attitudes towards discarding priors based on likelihood captured by α.
For the experimental results shown by Table 4.2 in Liang (2019), each row there can be cat-
egorized into some case in the Table 1 here19. As s1 is “good news” and s2 is “bad news” in his
terminology. A rather interesting pattern emerged from the choice data is when β > 1/2, the
subjects’ comparison is lower after receiving good news (s1) and higher after receiving bad news
(s2). Notice that from Table 1, the two directions of the comparisons are aligned with α < 1/2
and α > 1/2 respectively. This implies that the subjects may have different attitudes towards
discarding priors when the signal realization is different, especially when they are associated with
meanings such as “good news” and “bad news”. This pattern can be captured by the Contingent
RML, which is characterized exactly to reflect such flexibility in behaviors.
Moreover, the other rows of Table 4.2 correspond to the cases where α is irrelevant for this
comparison. The choice data there is also aligned with behaviors under RML, i.e. the subjects find
evaluations of f is lower under ambiguous signals20.
Therefore, not only the Contingent RMLwith α[{θ1, θ2}×s1] < 1/2 and α[{θ1, θ2}×s2] > 1/2
offers an interpretation for the different directions of comparison across signals, but it also provides
an approach to accommodate almost all the behavioral patterns in that experiment21.
In summary, for this special case where a DM has probabilistic belief over states and ambiguous
belief over signals, RML is able to provide richer predictions. Such richness, on the other hand,
also proves to be useful for applications involving ambiguous signals.
5 Likelihood-robust Ambiguous Persuasion: An Example
In settings such as mechanism design or information design, many recent papers show that the
designer could gain strictly more payoff by introducing ambiguity in their communications. These
findings are mostly observed in the case where the agent/receiver is modeled by MEU preferences
with FB updating. This section uses an example in the context of information design to explore
both the robustness of such a finding once the FB assumption is relaxed to RML and how the
generalization to RML may affect optimal persuasion.
Consider the persuasion environment studied by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the
sender commits to a signaling device and the receiver takes actions contingent on the signal re-
alizations. Bayesian persuasion describes the case where the available signaling devices for the
sender are only probabilistic: each device is a mapping from the state space to the distributions
over the signal space.
19The mentioned experimental result is included in appendix C for reference.
20Only row 8 of Table 4.2 in Liang (2019) is different from the prediction of RML. The last two rows do not specify
the signals thus are ignored.
21The same conclusion can be drawn also from a within-subject comparison shown in Table B.5 of Liang (2019)
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If the sender also has access to an ambiguous device, which specifies a set of probabilistic
devices and the probability of using any one of them is unknown22. Beaucheˆne et al. (2019) show
that when the receiver’s preference is represented by MEU with FB updating, the sender is able to
gain strictly more payoff by using an ambiguous device compared with the optimal probabilistic
device.
Notice that once the sender commits to an ambiguous device, from the receiver’s point of
view, it is exactly the updating ambiguous signals situation extensively discussed in the previous
section. Clearly, the FB assumption excludes the possibility that the receiver may be willing to
make inferences about the devices based on the likelihood of the realized signal. This raises the
possibility that the strict gain from using ambiguous signals may hinge on assumptions concerning
such inferences.
Beaucheˆne et al. (2019) briefly talk about the scenario where the receiver updates beliefs using
ML instead of FB. They show an example where the sender could strictly benefit from sending
ambiguous signals. However, in that example, the sender cannot benefit from sending ambiguous
signals if the receiver were assumed to update using FB. Thus, their additional discussion does not
resolve the issue addressed here, as it still relies on the specific updating rule.
RML, as a unifying updating rule including both FB and ML, provides a convenient tool to
address this issue. More specifically, with the parametrization of RML, one can check for which
values of the parameter α the same conclusion holds. In particular, if the strict gain from using
ambiguous signals can be guaranteed for all possible values of α, then such a finding is likelihood-
robust.
To give an example of such an analysis, I take the illustrative example from Beaucheˆne et al.
(2019) and relax their FB assumption to RML. For this particular example, first of all, the am-
biguous device they construct is more beneficial than the optimal probabilistic device only when
α = 0, i.e. only when RML reduces to FB. In other words, their finding of strict benefits from
using ambiguous signals seems to crucially depend on the specific assumption of FB.
Nonetheless, for this example, I further show that there exists a likelihood-robust ambiguous
device. It induces the same actions from the receiver for all possible values of α under RML.
Moreover, the sender gains strictly more payoff from this ambiguous device than from the optimal
probabilistic device. Namely, the strict benefit from using ambiguous signals in this example is
robust to the possibility that the receiver may make likelihood-based inferences from the realized
signals.
Example 3. There are two states {ωl, ωh} with a uniform marginal prior, and the receiver has
three feasible actions: {al, am, ah}. Payoff of the sender and receiver for each state and action is
given as follows:
ωl ωh
al (-1,3) (-1,-1)
am (0,2) (0,2)
ah (1,-1) (1,3)
where in each cell, the first number is the sender’s payoff and the second is the receiver’s.
22The sender can choose a set of probabilistic devices and delegate the choice from this set to a third party or to the
draw from an Ellsberg urn to make the signals ambiguous.
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Notice the sender always prefers the receiver to take higher action yet the receiver prefers to
choose the action that matches the state. Moreover, the sender is modeled to optimize her ex-ante
payoff under MEU preferences.
First, consider the setting with FB assumption. In the following, I replicate the construction of
the ambiguous device from Beaucheˆne et al. (2019). For more in-depth explanations, readers are
advised to refer to the original paper.
Let {ml, mh} be the set of signals and consider the following two probabilistic devices π1 and
π2, where the cell (ml, ωl) denotes the probability of generating signalml given state ωl.
π1(m|ω) ωl ωh
ml 2/3 0
mh 1/3 1
π2(m|ω) ωl ωh
ml 3/4 1/4
mh 1/4 3/4
If the sender’s ambiguous device is a set containing π1 and π2, then the receiver would form
the following set of posteriors:
p(ωh|ml) = {0, 1/4}
p(ωh|mh) = {3/4, 3/4}
where the first and second posterior in each set is updated from π1 and π2 respectively. Given these
posteriors, the receiver with MEU preference would take action am when signalml is realized and
takes action ah when signal mh is realized. The posterior p(ωh|ml) = 1/4 is crucial since any
posterior assigning a smaller probability on ωh would induce the receiver to take action al, which
makes the sender worse off.
Given the receiver’s action for each signal, the sender’s ex-ante evaluation of the ambiguous
device may also be affected by the existence of ambiguity. If the sender uses an ambiguous device
which contains exactly these two devices, then under MEU her ex-ante payoff is given by (us
stands for the sender’s utility function)
min
π∈{π1,π2}
(
1
2
π(ml|ωl) +
1
2
π(ml|ωh)
)
us(am) +
(
1
2
π(mh|ωl) +
1
2
π(mh|ωh)
)
us(ah)
=
(
1
2
π2(ml|ωl) +
1
2
π2(ml|ωh)
)
us(am) +
(
1
2
π2(mh|ωl) +
1
2
π2(mh|ωh)
)
us(ah)
=
1
2
us(am) +
1
2
us(ah)
This is exactly the payoff from using the optimal probabilistic device. Thus, the sender needs to
hedge against this ambiguity to get a higher payoff.
Consider the following construction: First, increase the number of signals to four such that now
the signals are {ml, mh, m
′
l, m
′
h}. Second, consider a probabilistic device generated by a mixture
of π1 and π2: π
′
1 = λπ1 ⊕ (1 − λ)π2. This represents a device sending signals {ml, mh} with
probability λ according to the device π1 and sending signals {m
′
l, m
′
h} with probability (1 − λ)
according to π2. Given this device, the receiver’s posteriors coincide with π1 whenm ∈ {ml, mh}
and coincides with π2 whenm ∈ {m
′
l, m
′
h}.
Moreover, consider the following two probabilistic devices constructed in the same manner
π′1 = λπ1 ⊕ (1− λ)π2 and π
′
2 = (1− λ)π2 ⊕ λπ1:
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π′1(m|ω) ωl ωh
ml λ · 2/3 0
mh λ · 1/3 λ
m′l (1− λ) · 3/4 (1− λ) · 1/4
m′h (1− λ) · 1/4 (1− λ) · 3/4
π′2(m|ω) ωl ωh
ml (1− λ) · 3/4 (1− λ) · 1/4
mh (1− λ) · 1/4 (1− λ) · 3/4
m′l λ · 2/3 0
m′h λ · 1/3 λ
When m ∈ {ml, mh}, the posterior of π
′
1 coincides with π1 and the posterior of π
′
2 coincides
with π2, so that the set of posteriors generated by the ambiguous device Π
′ = {π′1, π
′
2} remains the
same as the ambiguous device containing π1 and π2. Then signals ml and m
′
l would induce the
receiver to take action am and signalsmh andm
′
h would induce action ah.
Furthermore, notice that the difference between these two probabilistic devices is only the
labels of the signals. Thus, given the receiver’s action is the same across signal ml and m
′
l as
well as across signalsmh andm
′
h. The two probabilistic devices induce each action with the same
frequency, hence, the sender’s ex-ante payoff will be the same across these two devices. Therefore,
using an ambiguous device containing π′1 and π
′
2 will not generate any ambiguity for the sender’s
ex-ante payoff.
More specifically, the sender’s ex-ante payoff from this ambiguous device is given by
[
1
2
(1− λ) +
1
3
λ
]
us(am) +
[
1
2
(1− λ) +
2
3
λ
]
us(ah) (5.1)
which is strictly higher than using the optimal probabilistic device when λ > 0. Furthermore, it is
increasing in λ.
Therefore, the optimal ambiguous persuasion can be approached by letting λ → 1, notice that
λ cannot be exactly one.
So far, Beaucheˆne et al. (2019)’s construction of the optimal ambiguous device under the as-
sumption of FB is provided. Notice that the likelihood of generating the signals by each device
depends on λ. If letting λ→ 1, the likelihood of generating the same signal by each device might
be severely different.
Let li(m) denote the likelihood of generating signalm under device π
′
i:
π′1 l1(m) p(ωh|m)
ml λ · 1/3 0
mh λ · 2/3 3/4
m′l (1− λ) · 1/2 1/4
m′h (1− λ) · 1/2 3/4
π′2 l2(m) p(ωh|m)
ml (1− λ) · 1/2 1/4
mh (1− λ) · 1/2 3/4
m′l λ · 1/3 0
m′h λ · 2/3 3/4
When λ→ 1, notice that the likelihood of generating signalml by device π
′
2 goes to 0, whereas
the likelihood of ml by device π
′
1 goes to 1/3. Intuitively, knowing λ → 1, whenever signal ml is
observed, the receiver should be almost sure that it is generated by device π′1. However, the crucial
posterior 1/4 inducing action am is in fact generated by the other device π
′
2.
Indeed, for RML with any α > 0, since the device π′2 has the minimum likelihood of gener-
ating the signal ml, the crucial posterior 1/4 is always excluded from the set of posteriors. Then,
the receiver would find al to be strictly better than am, thus the desired action am can no longer be
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induced. One can also verify that the sender’s payoff is equivalent to some non-optimal probabilis-
tic device. Thus she instead becomes strictly worse off using ambiguous signals compared with
using the optimal probabilistic device when the receiver slightly deviates from FB in the direction
of ML.
Nonetheless, when λ = 3/5, the likelihood of generating signal ml by device π
′
1 and π
′
2 be-
comes the same and it is also true for the signal m′l. In this case, the receiver cannot use the
likelihood of the realized signal to make any inference about the devices. It is the case where FB
and ML coincide, and the receiver will always update with respect to both devices under RML no
matter what his α is. As the crucial posterior 1/4 will always be updated, the sender is able to
induce the action am from the receiver when signalml orm
′
l realizes.
Furthermore, even though the likelihood of generating mh and m
′
h is not the same across the
two devices, as the corresponding posteriors are the same, these signals can always induce the
same action ah from the receiver as well. That being said, the ambiguous device Π
′ with λ = 3/5
is able to always induce action am and ah with corresponding signals regardless of the receiver’s
likelihood-based inferences. In particular, for all possible values of α in the case of RML updating.
In addition, the sender’s payoff will be given by equation (5.1) with λ = 3/5. Thus the value
is strictly higher than using the optimal probabilistic device.
Therefore, this ambiguous device guarantees the sender strictly more payoff than using proba-
bilistic devices in a likelihood-robust way. As a result, it suggests that the strict benefit from using
ambiguous signals is robust to the concern that the receiver may make likelihood-based inferences
about the devices from the realized signals.
6 Related Literature
This paper adds to the literature on dynamic choice under ambiguity by proposing the RML up-
dating rule and providing an axiomatic foundation for it. RML is motivated by the idea of using
observed information to refine the initial belief in updating. For multiple priors, FB (Pires, 2002)
and ML (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993) are the two extremes of refining the initial set of priors
according to the likelihood of the observed information. RML is able to capture intermediate
behaviors between these two.
6.1 Refining the Initial Belief in Updating
The idea of refining beliefs as new information arrives is essential in many different non-Bayesian
updating rules. And it is certainly not an exclusive feature of updating multiple priors.
For example, when the initial belief is a single distribution over the states, Ortoleva (2012)
characterizes the hypothesis testing updating rule. Under this rule, if the probability of the observed
event is too small according to the initial belief, the DM will then find another prior as her revised
belief and apply Bayes’ rule to this new prior for updating. The revised prior is selected according
to a likelihood-based criterion. As a result, the hypothesis testing updating rule emphasizes dealing
with unexpected events, i.e. those assigned a probability of zero or almost zero under the initial
belief.
Also when the initial belief is a singleton, Zhao (2017) characterizes the Pseudo-Bayesian
updating rule when information takes the form “event A is more likely than event B”. In the
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case where received information contradicts the DM’s initial belief, she also finds another prior as
her revised belief and applies Bayes’ rule to update. This revised belief is chosen from the ones
satisfying the constraint specified by the unexpected information such that it is closest to the initial
belief in terms of Kullback-Leibler divergence.
When the initial belief is ambiguous yet the DM is ambiguity neutral represented by a sin-
gle prior, Suleymanov (2018) characterizes the Robust Maximum Likelihood updating rule in
which the DM revises her initial belief according to the maximum likelihood of the observed
event. Namely, the DM is an expected utility maximizer both ex-ante and conditionally, yet the
posterior is not updated from the prior. Thus, the main difference between the Robust Maximum
Likelihood and RML (Relative Maximum Likelihood) is that the latter updating rule requires the
posteriors to be updated from the subset of those priors representing the DM’s ex-ante preference.
In other words, RML necessarily reduces to Bayesian updating when the DM’s ex-ante preference
is represented by the expected utility, which is not true for Robust Maximum Likelihood updating.
In cases where the initial belief is a set of priors, one way of refining is discarding priors
from the initial set according to some criterion. RML belongs to this category. An updating rule
proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2007) uses likelihood ratio test in statistics as a criterion for
discarding priors. More discussions about the differences between RML and their rule can be
found in section 6.2
On the other hand, the dynamic consistent updating rule characterized in Hanany and Klibanoff
(2007) also features discarding priors, and the criterion there is to maintain the optimality of the
ex-ante optimal act.
Yet another way of refining is to consider a different set of priors, where it is possible that some
priors are not presented in the initial belief. Ortoleva (2014) characterizes the hypothesis testing
updating rule for multiple priors: if the likelihood of the observed event is too low under some
prior in the initial belief, then the DM will revise her initial belief and change to another set of
priors for updating.
Beyond the theoretical developments on this idea of refining the initial belief, De Filippis et al.
(2018) also identify such behavior in a social learning lab experiment. Their finding suggests that
the non-Bayesian behavior observed in the experiment is consistent with a generalized maximum
likelihood updating rule where subjects revise their initial belief according to the information re-
ceived.
6.2 Likelihood Ratio Test
A likelihood ratio test is commonly used in statistics to determine whether a statistical model
with fewer parameters is “good enough” compared with a model with the maximum number of
parameters. The former model is good enough if its likelihood of generating the observed data is
sufficiently close to the likelihood under the latter model according to their ratio compared with
some threshold.
In the literature on updating ambiguous beliefs, Epstein and Schneider (2007) explicitly use
the likelihood ratio test as the criterion to determine whether a prior will be updated or not. For
example, given a threshold λ ∈ [0, 1], the DM applies Bayes’ rule to update a prior p in the set of
priors C if and only if the following inequality holds:
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p(E)
max
p∈C
p(E)
≥ λ (6.1)
In this sense, the value of this threshold (λ) also reflects an extent of willingness to discard
priors based on likelihood. For RML, its functional form suggests a similar criterion for discarding
priors. Notice that, for all p ∈ Cα(E) ≡ αC
∗(E) + (1− α)C,
p(E)
max
p∈C
p(E)
≥ α + (1− α)
min
p∈C
p(E)
max
p∈C
p(E)
or equivalently
p(E)−min
p∈C
p(E)
max
p∈C
p(E)−min
p∈C
p(E)
≥ α
The second formula implies that the criterion suggested by RML considers a relative likelihood
ratio test where minp∈C p(E) becomes an additional benchmark. The threshold α determines the
fraction of priors that are deemed to be plausible according to relative likelihood. Clearly, when
the minimal probability of event E is zero, this criterion coincides with that in equation (6.1) when
α = λ.
Importantly, however, this relative likelihood ratio criterion is only a necessary condition for
a prior to be updated by Bayes’ rule according to RML. The linear contraction suggests that the
shape of the set of priors C also plays a crucial role. In fact, the set Cα(E) sometimes is a strict
subset of the set satisfying the relative likelihood ratio criterion with the same α.
Let Cˆα(E) denote the set satisfying the relative likelihood ratio criterion with some α:
Cˆα(E) =

p ∈ C :
p(E)−min
p∈C
p(E)
max
p∈C
p(E)−min
p∈C
p(E)
≥ α


Figure 4 shows a case where Cα(E) $ Cˆα(E). For the same scenario as in figure 1, notice that
the area below the red dashed line and in the set C is the set Cˆα(E) with the same α as in Cα(E).
Hence the area below the red dashed line yet is not in Cα(E) represents the priors satisfying the
likelihood-based criterion yet are still discarded under RML updating.
In summary, thoughRML is in someways similar to rules, such as those in Epstein and Schneider
(2007), using likelihood ratio thresholds, its reliance on the relative likelihood ratios and on the
shape of the set of priors differentiate it from such approaches.
Further comparison of RML with updating rules using likelihood ratio thresholds may be seen
through comparison of the characterization axioms. For example, both Kovach (2015) and Hill
(2019) provide axiomatic characterizations for such updating rules in different frameworks. Their
axioms leverage the objective lotteries to calibrate the DM’s subjective belief about the condition-
ing events. In contrast, the axiomatization of RML does not rely on this special structure.
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ω2
ω3
ω1
C
C∗({ω1, ω2})
Cα({ω1, ω2})
Cˆα({ω1, ω2})
Figure 4: Graphical Illustration of Cα(E) and Cˆα(E)
6.3 Dynamic Choice under Ambiguity
A fundamental issue in dynamic choice under ambiguity is the fact that, for ambiguity sensitive
choices, an updating rule cannot preserve both consequentialism and dynamic consistency at the
same time (Hanany and Klibanoff, 2007; Siniscalchi, 2009).
According to the definition in Hanany and Klibanoff (2007), consequentialism means that con-
ditional preferences should not depend on an event not occurring or the context of the decision
problem (e.g. feasible acts, etc.). Dynamic consistency (which is weaker than the DC axiom in
this paper) means that the ex-ante most preferred act should remain optimal to any other acts that
are both feasible and agree with it on the event not occurring after updating. Any updating rule for
ambiguous beliefs without other restrictions needs to relax either one of these two properties.
RML takes the consequentialist approach by requiring consequentialism and relaxing dynamic
consistency. The essential implication of consequentialism is that the DM should update her belief
in the same way regardless of the decision problem at hand. In other words, the updated belief is
given by a function of only the ex-ante belief and the conditioning event.
As a result, dynamic consistency will sometimes be violated under RML. On one hand, the
violation of dynamic consistency under ambiguity is commonly observed in experiments, e.g.
Dominiak et al. (2012). On the other hand, consistent planning is proposed in the literature as
a way to overcome this problem of consequentialist updating rules. With consistent planning, the
DM is assumed to be sophisticated such that she is able to anticipate her future decisions and
chooses an ex-ante optimal plan accordingly. A behavioral characterization of consistent planning
is given by Siniscalchi (2011).
Along another route, Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) and Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) axioma-
tize updating rules that preserve dynamic consistency yet do not require consequentialism. More
specifically, the dynamic consistent updating rules for multiple priors characterized in Hanany and Klibanoff
(2007) explicitly depend on the feasible set of acts as well as the optimal acts. Therefore, different
decision problems result in different updated beliefs according to this rule.
Instead of relaxing one of these two properties, Epstein and Schneider (2003) characterize the
rectangularity condition for the set of priors such that dynamic consistency is preserved under FB
updating, i.e. consequentialism also holds. Namely, dynamic consistency and consequentialism
can both be satisfied when the ex-ante belief takes a specific form. The regularity condition, how-
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ever, imposes a restriction on the possible conditioning events to which FB updating is applicable.
Another way of keeping both consequentialism and dynamic consistency is to relax reduction
of compound evaluations23, pursued by Li (2015) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2017). According to
this approach, the DM’s ex-ante evaluation of an act will also depend on the temporal resolution
of uncertainty.
In addition, Gul and Pesendorfer (2017) observe a feature of both FB and ML, which is “all
news is bad news”. Namely, a DM sometimes finds that the ex-ante preferred alternative is domi-
nated by another alternative no matter what the signal realization is. Assuming “not all news can
be bad news”, they use this axiom to characterize the updating by proxy rule for preferences ad-
mitting CEU representation with totally monotone capacities. This class of preferences is a strict
subset of the preferences considered in this paper.
Their observation “all news is bad news” also applies to RML, since FB and ML are special
cases of RML. However, requiring “not all news can be bad news” as in the updating by proxy rule
sometimes implies that the beliefs updated from ambiguous signals are completely unambiguous24.
Without imposing such an assumption, RML on the other hand allows for more flexibility in terms
of how much ambiguity can be preserved when updating ambiguous signals.
7 Concluding Remarks
A general updating procedure for multiple priors proposed at the beginning of this paper specifies
two steps. In the first step, the DM uses the observed information to refine the initial belief. And
then in the second step, she applies Bayes’ rule to update the remaining priors.
Bayesian updating of a single prior belief is a special case where the first step is absent. In the
case where the true probability law governing the uncertainty is known, such absence is reasonable
since one cannot further refine the belief but can only update it conditional on the information
received.
However, in scenarios where the underlying probability law is unknown, the DM needs to form
a conjecture about the uncertainty for decision making. Whether the conjecture is a singleton or
a set of probabilities, it all seems too stringent to require the DM to always stick with her initial
conjecture despite new information she might receive. Thus, applying Bayes’ rule to the conjecture
belief actually reflects confidence about her initial belief. Accordingly, updating rules that do not
reflect such confidence and allow for revising the initial belief might also be reasonable.
Several different updating rules have been proposed in the literature to capture the situation in
which initial conjecture is a singleton and it may be revised after seeing new information. For when
the initial beliefs are multiple priors, this paper proposes RML updating rule, in which the initial
beliefs are revised based on the likelihood of the information observed. More importantly, this
paper pinpoints the behaviors that are equivalent to such an updating rule providing a preference
foundation for using likelihood as a criterion in updating.
This paper also uses RML to address applications involving ambiguity in information design
and mechanism design. Many existing results in these areas are derived based on the specific
assumption of FB. I have shown RML to be useful for identifying the extent of deviation from
FB allowed for those results to still hold. Last but not least, I illustrate through an example that
23Or the law of iterated expectation in Gul and Pesendorfer (2017)’s terminology
24See Example 1 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2017) for an example
28
adopting RML instead of FB as the model of updating helps robustify results from the literature
meanwhile maintaining tractability.
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Appendix A Proofs of the results
Throughout all the proofs, let C denote the convex and closed set of priors representing the ex-
ante preference; let C∗(E) denote the subset of C assigning a maximal probability to the event E:
C∗(E) ≡ {p ∈ C : p(E) ≥ p′(E) ∀p′ ∈ C} and let p∗(E) denote the maximal probability of event
E: p∗(E) ≡ maxp∈C p(E).
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.4
Necessity. The necessity of CR-S for ML updating is proved via the following three lemmas:
Lemma A.1. Suppose the conditional preferences are represented by ML. For all strict %-nonnull
E ∈ Σ, for all f ∈ F and for all x, x∗ ∈ X with x∗ % x, if f ∼E x and
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
then fEx
∗ ∼ xEx
∗.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Suppose the conditional preferences are represented by ML. For any strict
%-nonnull E, f ∼E x implies that min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f) dp
p(E)
= u(x), then one can further derive
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
= min
p∈C∗(E)
[∫
E
u(fEx
∗)
dp
p(E)
· p(E) + (1− p(E))u(x∗)
]
= p∗(E) · min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p∗(E)
+ (1− p∗(E))u(x∗)
= p∗(E)u(x) + (1− p∗(E))u(x∗)
= min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp
where the third equality follows from p(E) = p∗(E) for all p ∈ C∗(E), the last equality follows
from the fact that u(x∗) ≥ u(x) as x∗ % x.
Lemma A.2. For all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ, for all f ∈ F , if there exists x¯ ∈ X such that
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx¯)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx¯)dp
then for all x∗ % x¯ one has
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
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Proof of Lemma A.2. For any strict%-nonnull E ∈ Σ and any f ∈ F . Suppose there exists x ∈ X
such that min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp. Towards a contradiction suppose there also
exists x′ such that x′ % x as well as
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
′)dp < min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
′)dp
Then this strict inequality further implies:
min
p∈C
[∫
E
u(f)dp+ u(x′)(1− p(E))
]
< min
p∈C∗(E)
[∫
E
u(f)dp+ u(x′)(1− p(E))
]
min
p∈C
[∫
E
u(f)dp+ u(x′)(1− p(E))
]
< min
p∈C∗(E)
[∫
E
u(f)dp+ u(x)(1− p∗(E)) + (u(x′)− u(x))(1− p∗(E))
]
min
p∈C
[∫
E
u(f)dp+ u(x′)(1− p(E))
]
− (u(x′)− u(x))(1− p∗(E)) < min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
min
p∈C
[∫
E
u(f)dp+ u(x)(1− p(E)) + (u(x′)− u(x))(p∗(E)− p(E))
]
< min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
min
p∈C
[∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp+ (u(x
′)− u(x))(p∗(E)− p(E))
]
< min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
Notice that for the LHS of the last inequality, the minimum of
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp can be obtained at
some p ∈ C∗(E) which also minimizes the second term (u(x′)− u(x))(p∗(E)− p(E)), since for
all p ∈ C, p∗(E)−p(E) ≥ 0. Thus the minimum of LHS is obtained at some p with p(E) = p∗(E)
and it implies
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp < min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
which is a contradiction.
Lemma A.3. If % admits MEU representation with C having finitely many extreme points, then
for all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ, for all f ∈ F , an x¯E,f ∈ X such that both
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx¯E,f)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx¯E,f)dp
and x¯E,f %E f hold always exists.
Proof of Lemma A.3. First show that when C contains only finitely many extreme points, an x¯E,f
such that fE x¯E,f is evaluated at some extreme point in C
∗(E) always exists.
Let q be any extreme point of C∗(E) and let p be any extreme point of C. The act fEx¯E,f is
evaluated at q if for all extreme points p of C,
∫
Ω
u(fEx¯E,f)dq ≤
∫
Ω
u(fE x¯E,f)dp
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It can be further derived as∫
E
u(f)dq + (1− q(E))u(x¯E,f) ≤
∫
E
u(f)dp+ (1− p(E))u(x¯E,f) (A.1)
Notice that the first term of both LHS and RHS does not depend on x¯E,f , furthermore, (1−q(E)) ≤
(1− p(E)) as q ∈ C∗(E). When p is also in C∗(E), the value of x¯E,f does not matter and one can
pin down the q ∈ C∗(E) such that minimizes the evaluation of fE x¯E,f among all extreme points
in C∗(E). Denote the minimizing q by q∗.
Fix q∗, for an extreme point p not in C∗(E), the following inequality becomes strict: (1 −
q∗(E)) < (1− p(E)). Then for all E, f and such an extreme point p, inequality (A.1) holds if
u(x¯E,f,p) ≥
∫
E
u(f)dq∗ −
∫
E
u(f)dp
q∗(E)− p(E)
Since X is unbounded from above under the ex-ante preference, such an x¯E,f,p always exist. Then
it suffices to let x¯E,f = max{maxp x¯E,f,p, x} for x ∼E f where both “max” are according to the
ex-ante preference. Since there are only finitely many extreme points p in C, the maximum over a
finite set always exists.
In summary, for all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ, for all f ∈ F and x ∈ X , Lemma A.2 and A.3
together show the existence of a threshold x¯E,f such that for all x
∗ % x¯E,f , the maxmin evaluation
of the act fEx
∗ is given by an extreme point of C∗(E), meanwhile x∗ % x. Then Lemma A.1
further implies that, when %E is given by ML updating, for all x
∗ % x¯E,f one has fEx
∗ ∼ xEx
∗.
Sufficiency. For the sufficiency of CR-S, fix any strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ, consider the contra
positive statement: not ML updating implies not CR-S.
Let CE be the closed and convex set of posteriors representing the conditional preference %E .
Not ML updating implies that CE 6= {p/p(E) : p ∈ C
∗(E)}. In other words, either there exists
p˜ ∈ C∗(E) such that p˜/p˜(E) /∈ CE, or there exists q ∈ CE such that q /∈ {p/p(E) : p ∈ C
∗(E)}
or both.
Not CR-S means that there exists an f ∈ F and x ∈ X with f ∼E x such that, for all x¯ ∈ X ,
there always exists x∗ % x¯ with fEx
∗ ≁ xEx∗.
For the two different cases of not ML, since both CE and {p/p(E) : p ∈ C
∗(E)} are convex
and closed set, the same type of separating hyperplane argument can be applied to both cases. Thus
the proof here only shows the implication of the first case, while the same argument applies to the
other case.
Formally, in the first case, there exists p˜ ∈ C∗(E) such that p˜/p˜(E) /∈ CE . As {p˜/p˜(E)} is
compact and CE is convex and closed, the geometric form of Hahn-Banach theorem implies that
there exists an act f ∈ F such that25∫
E
u(f)
dp˜
p˜(E)
< min
p∈CE
∫
E
u(f)dp
Then first as p˜ ∈ C∗(E), one has
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
≤
∫
E
u(f)
dp˜
p˜(E)
25See Theorem 1.7 of Brezis (2010) for a reference.
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Second, for any x ∈ X , f ∼E x implies that minp∈CE
∫
E
u(f)dp = u(x). These inequalities and
equality together imply that
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
< u(x)
On the other hand by Lemma A.3, there always exists an x¯E,f such that x¯E,f % x and for all
x∗ % x¯E,f ,
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
Then for any x∗ % x¯E,f , the following is true:
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
[∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
· p(E) + u(x∗)(1− p(E))
]
= p∗(E) min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
+ u(x∗)(1− p∗(E))
< p∗(E) · u(x) + u(x∗)(1− p∗(E))
= min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp
Namely, if f ∼E x then fEx
∗ ≺ xEx
∗ for all x∗ % x¯E,f . That is, for this f ∈ F , for any
x¯ ∈ X , there always exists x∗ % x¯ such that fEx
∗ ≺ xEx
∗. Therefore, CR-S is not true.
The argument for the second case is analogously the same and combining both cases shows
that not ML updating implies not CR-S.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
The necessity of CR-UO is given in the main text. For DC-CS, reversing the arguments in step 4
of proving sufficiency shows that equation (A.10) is necessary under Contingent RML updating.
It then immediately implies that DC-CS needs to be true.
For the sufficiency, fix any strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ, the proof proceeds by the following steps:
Step 1. Show that for all f ∈ F there exists α[E, f ] ∈ [0, 1] such that, for all sufficiently large
consequence x∗ ∈ X one has
α[E, f ]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(fEx) = α[E, f ]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(x) (A.2)
Furthermore, α[E, f ] is unique if either fEx ≺ x or fEx
∗ ≻ xEx
∗ hold.
When CR-UO is true, f ∼E x implies fEx - x and there exists x¯E,f ∈ X such that fEx
∗ %
xEx
∗ for all x∗ % x¯E,f .
First consider all x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ % x¯E,f and x
∗ % x, then the following inequalities
hold: fEx
∗ % xEx
∗ % x % fEx, which further implies that, for each x
∗, there always exists an
α[E, f ] ∈ [0, 1] such that the following equation holds: (see figure 3)
α[E, f ]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(fEx) = α[E, f ]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(x)
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Notice that, α[E, f ] here may depend on the value of x∗ because the act fEx
∗ could be evaluated
at different extreme points for different x∗. However, in the case where fEx
∗ is always evaluated
at the extreme points in C∗(E), as both U(fEx
∗) and U(xEx
∗) have the common term u(x∗)(1 −
p∗(E)) which cancels out, α[E, f ] does not depend on the value of x∗ any more.
By Lemma A.2 and A.3, for all f ∈ F , there exists another threshold xˆE,f such that for all
x∗ % xˆE,f , one has
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
Therefore, there existsα[E, f ] such that the following is true for all x∗ % max{x¯E,f , x, xˆE,f}:
26
α[E, f ]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(fEx) = α[E, f ]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(x)
Furthermore, it is easy to see that this α[E, f ] is unique if either fEx ≺ x or fEx
∗ ≻ xEx
∗ hold.
Step 2. Construction of acts satisfying the premises of DC-CS.
Equivalence Class. First, for any two acts f, f ′, denote them by f ≡E f
′ if f(ω) = f ′(ω) for
all ω ∈ E. Then an equivalence class of acts can be accordingly defined:
[f ] = {f ′ ∈ F : f ′ ≡E f}
By step 1, α[E, f ] = α[E, f ′] whenever f ′ ∈ [f ]. Hereafter, I use f to denote the whole class of
acts [f ], as it should cause no confusion.
When α[E] is not unique. If there does not exist any f ∈ F with α[E, f ] being unique. Then
by step 1, for all f ∈ F and x ∈ X with f ∼E x, it implies that both fEx ∼ x and fEx
∗ ∼ xEx
∗
for all sufficiently large x∗ hold.
Then it is the case in which both CR-C and CR-S hold at the same time. Namely, the condi-
tional preference %E can be represented by both FB and ML. As E is strict %-nonnull, it implies
that C = C∗(E). In other words, C 6= C∗(E) implies there exists at least an f ∈ F such that
α[E, f ] is unique.
When unique α[E, f ] exists, fix some f ∈ F such that α[E, f ] is unique.
α[E, f ] is unchanged under mixture with constant acts. For any y ∈ X , for any λ ∈ (0, 1]
consider the act fλy = λf + (1 − λ)y, which is an Anscombe-Aumann mixture of acts
27. By
certainty independence, f ∼E x implies that fλy ∼E λx + (1 − λ)y. Let xλy ∈ X denote the
consequence indifferent to λx+ (1− λ)y. Then for all x∗ that are sufficiently large for f and fλy,
equation (A.2) for fλy implies that
α[E, fλy]U([fλy]Ex
∗)+(1−α[E, fλy])U([fλy]Exλy) = α[E, fλy]U([xλy]Ex
∗)+(1−α[E, fλy])U(xλy)
(A.3)
Moreover, α[E, fλy] is unique. Notice that
U([fλy]Exλy) = U([fEx]λy) = λU(fEx) + (1− λ)U(y)
26Throughout this proof, whenever I say “for all x∗ that are sufficiently good for some acts”, it means that for each
one of those acts, say f , x∗ % max{x¯E,f , x, xˆE,f} holds.
27The case λ = 0 is excluded since when λ = 0, fλy coincides with y, and then α[E, y] is not unique.
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where the first equality follows from Anscombe-Aumann mixture, the second equality follows
from certainty independence.
Then one can write equation (A.3) as
α[E, fλy] min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(fλy)dp+ (1− α[E, fλy])[λU(fEx) + (1− λ)U(y)]
= α[E, fλy]u(xλy)p
∗(E) + (1− α[E, fλy])[λU(x) + (1− λ)U(y)]
which further implies that
α[E, fλy]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E, fλy])U(fEx) = α[E, fλy]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, fλy])U(x)
As f ∼E x one also has
α[E, f ]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(fEx) = α[E, f ]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(x)
Since α[E, f ] is unique, it has to be the case that α[E, fλy] = α[E, f ] for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and y ∈ X .
Construction of acts satisfying premises of DC-CS. Recall that the utility function u(·) is
normalized such that u(X) = (u,∞) for some u ∈ R<0 ∪ {−∞}, asX is unbounded from above.
For the fixed f ∈ F , for any ǫ > 0, there always exists an act fǫ given by taking mixtures
between f and some constant act such that u(fǫ(ω)) ∈ [0, ǫ] for all ω ∈ Ω. For example, taking
mixtures with the constant act z such that u(z) = ǫ/2. By previous argument, one has α[E, fǫ] =
α[E, f ].
Take any act g ∈ F that cannot be obtained from f by taking mixtures with constant acts. (If
can, then α[E, g] = α[E, f ]) For any λ ∈ (0, 1] and y ∈ X , consider the act gλy, i.e. the λ mixture
between g and y.
Then for the two premises of DC-CS28, it suffices to find λ ∈ (0, 1] and y ∈ X such that the
following two equations hold:
U(fǫEx) = U([gλy]Ex) (A.4)
for x ∼E fǫ and
U(fǫEx
∗) = U([gλy]Ex
∗) (A.5)
for all x∗ that is sufficiently good for fǫ and gλy. The threshold for x
∗ could be chosen after fǫ and
gλy are pinned down such that both U(fǫEx
∗) and U([gλy]Ex
∗) will both be evaluated at extreme
points in C∗(E).
Consider the extreme points of the set of posteriors of C∗(E), let qf and qg denote the two of
them evaluating fǫ and gλy respectively, then from equation (A.5) one can derive
U(fǫEx
∗) = U([gλy]Ex
∗)
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u([gλy]Ex
∗)dp
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fǫEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u([gλy]Ex
∗)dp
28Notice here fǫ takes the role of f and gλy takes the role of g in the statement of this axiom.
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min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)dp+ u(x∗)(1− p∗(E)) = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(gλy)dp+ u(x
∗)(1− p∗(E))
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(gλy)dp
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p∗(E)
= min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(gλy)
dp
p∗(E)
i.e.
u(fǫ) · qf = λu(g) · qg + (1− λ)u(y)
Thus, for each λ ∈ (0, 1], the constant act y could be pinned down by letting
(1− λ)u(y) = u(fǫ) · qf − λu(g) · qg (A.6)
and y is arbitrary if λ = 1.
Next consider equation (A.4):
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫEx)dp = min
p∈C
{
λ
∫
E
u(g)dp+ (1− λ)u(y)p(E) + (1− p(E))u(x)
}
Consider the RHS of this equation and plug into (1− λ)u(y) from equation (A.6) yields
min
p∈C
{
λ
∫
E
u(g)dp+ [u(fǫ) · qf − λu(g) · qg]p(E) + (1− p(E))u(x)
}
= min
p∈C
{
u(fǫ) · qfp(E) + (1− p(E))u(x) + λ
[∫
E
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E)
]}
i.e.
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫEx)dp = min
p∈C
{
u(fǫ) · qfp(E) + (1− p(E))u(x) + λ
[∫
E
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E)
]}
(A.7)
Therefore, equation (A.4) holds if there exists λ ∈ (0, 1] that solves equation (A.7). Notice that the
LHS of equation (A.7) does not depend on λ, meanwhile the RHS is a continuous function of λ,
which I further denoted it by R(λ).
Given continuity, the existence of a solution to equation (A.7) can be proved by showing that
R(0) > LHS and R(1) < LHS.
First consider R(0):
R(0) = min
p∈C
{u(fǫ) · qfp(E) + (1− p(E))u(x)}
≥ min
p∈C
{u(x)p(E) + (1− p(E))u(x)}
= u(x)
> min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫEx)dp = LHS
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where the second and forth inequality comes from fǫEx
∗ % xEx
∗ and x % fǫEx respectively. The
forth inequality is strict because of the fact that α[E, f ] is unique, thus one of the inequalities has
to be strict.
Next consider R(1):
R(1) = min
p∈C
{
u(fǫ) · qfp(E) + (1− p(E))u(x) +
∫
E
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E)
}
≤ ǫ+min
p∈C
{∫
E
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E)
}
= ǫ+min
p∈C
{
p(E) ·
[∫
E
u(g)
dp
p(E)
− u(g) · qg
]}
where the inequality follows from u(fǫ) ≤ ǫ.
For the second term, its minimum is 0 if it is the case min
p∈C
∫
E
u(g) dp
p(E)
− u(g) · qg = 0. In this
case, notice that conditional evaluation of g coincides under FB and ML updating. That is, both
CR-C and CR-S holds for g, then α[E, g] is not unique. It suffices to let α[E, g] = α[E, f ].
On the other hand, if it is the casemin
p∈C
∫
E
u(g) dp
p(E)
−u(g) · qg < 0, the minimum of the second
term is negative. Then it suffices to find ǫ > 0 such that
ǫ < −min
p∈C
{
p(E) ·
[∫
E
u(g)
dp
p(E)
− u(g) · qg
]}
Given this ǫ, it further implies that
R(1) < ǫ− ǫ = 0 ≤ min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫEx)dp = LHS
Therefore, the existence of λ ∈ (0, 1) that solves equation (A.7) is guaranteed.
Finally, once λ is solved, u(y) is given by equation (A.6):
u(y) =
u(fǫ) · qf − λu(g) · qg
1− λ
≥ −
λ
1− λ
u(g) · qg
where the last inequality comes from u(fǫ(ω)) ≥ 0. It remains to show that u(y) > u to guarantee
the existence of this construction. It suffices to transform g by taking mixtures with constant acts
before the construction to get u(g) · qg ≤ 0, then it would imply u(y) ≥ 0 > u as desired.
Step 3. DC-CS impliesα[E, f ] to be a constant across all f ∈ F , and it is unique ifC 6= C∗(E).
In the following, I abuse notation to use f to denote fǫ and g to denote gλy be the pair of acts
constructed in the last step satisfying the two premises of DC-CS.
By step 1, f ∼E x implies that
α[E, f ]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(fEx) = α[E, f ]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(x) (A.8)
DC-CS implies g ∼E x and thus,
α[E, g]U(gEx
∗) + (1− α[E, g])U(gEx) = α[E, g]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, g])U(x) (A.9)
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Consider the LHS of equation (A.9) and denote it by L:
L = α[E, g]U(gEx
∗) + (1− α[E, g])U(gEx)
= α[E, f ]U(gEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(gEx) + [α[E, g]− α[E, f ]](U(gEx
∗)− U(gEx))
≡ L′ + [α[E, g]− α[E, f ]]M1
Meanwhile the RHS of equation (A.9) denoted by R can be further derived as
R = α[E, g]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, g])U(x)
= α[E, f ]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E, f ])U(x) + [α[E, g]− α[E, f ]](U(xEx
∗)− U(x))
≡ R′ + [α[E, g]− α[E, f ]]M2
Notice that by equation (A.8), R′ also equals to (1 − α[E, f ])U(fEx) + α[E, f ]U(fEx
∗). Thus
L′ = R′ as fEx ∼ gEx and fEx
∗ ∼ gEx
∗ hold.
Then the fact L = R implies
L− R = L′ + [α[E, g]− α[E, f ]]M1 − R
′ − [α[E, g]− α[E, f ]]M2 = 0
⇒ L′ −R′ = [α[E, f ]− α[E, g]][M1 −M2]
Further notice that
M1 −M2 = [U(gEx
∗)− U(gEx)]− [U(xEx
∗)− U(x)]
=
[
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(gEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp
]
− [u(x)p∗(E) + u(x∗)(1− p∗(E))− u(x)]
=
[
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(gEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp
]
− [u(x∗)− u(x)](1− p∗(E))
=
[
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(gEx
∗)dp− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp
]
− [u(x∗)− u(x)](1− p∗(E))
+
[
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp
]
= min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp
where the last equality follows from
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(gEx
∗)dp− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(gEx)dp
=
[
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(g)
dp
p(E)
− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(g)
dp
p(E)
]
p∗(E) + [u(x∗)− u(x)](1− p∗(E))
Next, consider the following lemma:
Lemma A.4. For any f ∈ F such that α[E, f ] is unique, if f ∼E x then
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp < min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
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Proof of Lemma A.4. Since if α[E, f ] is unique, it implies that for f ∼E x, one of the inequalities
fEx
∗ % xEx
∗ and x % fEx is strict. Notice that the first inequality implies
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(f)dp ≥ u(x)p∗(E)
and the second implies that
u(x) ≥ min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
Add the term u(x)(1− p∗(E)) to both sides of the first inequality, then combine both inequal-
ities and recall that one of them has to be strict yield:
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(f)dp+ u(x)(1− p∗(E)) > min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
which is equivalent to min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp > min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp.
Define
∆fEx ≡ min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
If α[E, g] is not unique, then it suffice to let α[E, g] = α[E, f ]. If it is also unique, given
Lemma A.4, g ∼E x implies that
∆gEx > 0
Therefore the difference
L′ − R′ = [α[E, f ]− α[E, g]][M1 −M2] = [α[E, f ]− α[E, g]] ·∆gEx
is 0 if and only if α[E, f ] = α[E, g].
Notice that the construction in step 2 can be applied to any g ∈ F . It then implies that α[E, f ]
needs to be a constant across all f ∈ F . Therefore, equation (A.2) now can be written as
α[E]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E])U(fEx) = α[E]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E])U(x) (A.10)
Step 4. Equation (A.10) implies that the DM’s conditional evaluation of any f ∈ F can be
represented by
min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
= u(x)
i.e. is given by RML updating with α[E].
For all sufficiently good x∗, the LHS of equation (A.10) can further be derived as:
α[E]U(fEx
∗) + (1− α[E])U(fEx)
= α[E] min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp+ (1− α[E]) min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
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= α[E] min
q∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dq + (1− α[E]) min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
= α[E]
[
min
q∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dq
p∗(E)
· p∗(E) + (1− p∗(E))u(x∗)
]
+ (1− α[E]) min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
= α[E]
[
min
q∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dq
p∗(E)
· p∗(E) + (1− p∗(E))u(x)
]
+ α[E][u(x∗)− u(x)][1− p∗(E)] + (1− α[E]) min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
where the second equality follows from fEx
∗ is evaluated at some p ∈ C∗(E).
On the other hand, the RHS of equation (A.10) can also be derived as
α[E]U(xEx
∗) + (1− α[E])U(x)
= α[E] min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp+ (1− α[E])u(x)
= α[E][u(x)p∗(E) + u(x∗)(1− p∗(E))] + (1− α[E])u(x)
= α[E][u(x∗)− u(x)][1− p∗(E)] + u(x)
Observe that now equalizing the LHS and RHS of equation (A.10) implies
u(x) = α[E]
[
min
q∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dq
p∗(E)
· p∗(E) + (1− p∗(E))u(x)
]
+ (1− α[E]) min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
= α[E] min
q∈C∗(E)
u(fEx)dq + (1− α[E]) min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
= min
q∈C∗(E)
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)d((α[E])q + (1− α[E])p)
= min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
where Cα[E](E) = α[E]C
∗(E) + (1− α[E])C.
From the last equality one can further derive
0 = min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp− u(x)
= min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
Ω
[u(fEx)− u(x)]dp
= min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
E
[u(f)− u(x)]dp
= min
p∈Cα[E](E)
[∫
E
u(f)dp− u(x)p(E)
]
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When E is strict %-nonnull, p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ Cα[E](E), then the last equality further
implies
0 = min
p∈Cα[E](E)
[∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
− u(x)
]
i.e.
min
p∈Cα[E](E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
= u(x)
which represents the conditional evaluation of f under %E since f ∼E x.
Therefore, the conditional preference %E for each strict %-nonnull event E is given by RML
updating with α[E].
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Given Theorem 3.3, the only remaining proof here is to show that α[E] is a constant across all
events if and only if the EC axiom holds.
The necessity of the EC axiom is also immediate when one plugs a constant α into equation
(A.10).
In the following I show that EC implies α[E] to be a constant across all strict %-nonnull events
First of all, consider the case that there does not exist any strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ such that
C 6= C∗(E). Then it implies that all p ∈ C agree with the probability of all strict %-nonnull event
E.
Thus, if there exists only one strict %-nonnull event E such that C 6= C∗(E), i.e. α[E] is
unique, then it suffices to let this α[E] to be the constant α across all events.
Next, when there exists at least two strict %-nonnull events, E1 and E2, such that both α[E1]
and α[E2] are unique.
Similar to the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.3, fix any f ∈ F . For any ǫ > 0, let fǫ
denote the act given by taking mixtures between f and some constant act such that u(fǫ(ω)) ∈ [0, ǫ]
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Take any g ∈ F , let gλy denote the act given by taking mixtures between g and y ∈ X with
λ ∈ (0, 1].
Then for the two premises of EC, it suffices to find λ and y such that the following equations
hold:
U(fǫE1x) = U([gλy]E2x) (A.11)
for x ∼E1 fǫ and
U(fǫE1x
∗
1) = U([gλy]E2x
∗
2) (A.12)
for all sufficiently large x∗1 and x
∗
2 with xE1x
∗
1 ∼ xE2x
∗
2.
As the threshold for x∗1 and x
∗
2 could be chosen after fǫ and gλy are pinned down, thus both
U(fǫE1x
∗
1) and U([gλy]E2x
∗
2) can be guaranteed to be evaluated at an extreme point of C
∗(E1) and
an extreme point of C∗(E2) respectively.
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Then from equation (A.12) one can further derive
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫE1x
∗
1)dp = min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u([gλy]Ex
∗
2)dp
⇒ min
p∈C∗(E1)
∫
E1
u(fǫ)dp+ u(x
∗
1)(1− p
∗(E1)) = min
p∈C∗(E2)
∫
E2
u(gλy)dp+ u(x
∗
2)(1− p
∗(E2))
Let qf and qg be the two extreme points in the set of posteriors of C
∗(E1) and C
∗(E2) that
evaluate fǫ and gλy respectively, then the last equality can be written as:
u(fǫ) · qf + u(x
∗
1)(1− p
∗(E1)) = u(gλy) · qg + u(x
∗
2)(1− p
∗(E2))
Furthermore as the condition xE1x
∗
1 ∼ xE2x
∗
2 implies that
u(x)p∗(E1) + u(x
∗
1)(1− p
∗(E1)) = u(x)p
∗(E2) + u(x
∗
2)(1− p
∗(E2))
i.e.
u(x∗1)(1− p
∗(E1))− u(x
∗
2)(1− p
∗(E2)) = u(x)[p
∗(E2)− p
∗(E1)]
As E1 and E2 are chosen arbitrarily, without loss of generality, let p
∗(E2) − p
∗(E1) ≥ 0 and also
notice that u(x) ≥ 0. In the following, letM ≡ u(x)[p∗(E2)− p
∗(E1)]. Notice thatM ∈ [0, ǫ].
Then equation (A.11) is further equivalent to
u(fǫ) · qf +M = λu(g) · qg + (1− λ)u(y) (A.13)
Therefore, for each λ ∈ (0.1], equation (A.12) holds if (1− λ)u(y) is given by the following
(1− λ)u(y) = u(fǫ) · qf +M − λu(g) · qg (A.14)
and y is arbitrary if λ = 1.
Next consider the equation (A.11)
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫE1x)dp = min
p∈C
{∫
E2
λu(g)dp+ (1− λ)u(y)p(E2) + u(x)(1− p(E2))
}
Plugging into (1− λ)u(y) from equation (A.14) to the RHS and denote it by R(λ):
R(λ) =min
p∈C
{∫
E2
λu(g)dp+ u(fǫ) · qfp(E2) +Mp(E2)− λu(g) · qgp(E2) + u(x)(1− p(E2))
}
= min
p∈C
{
u(fǫ) · qfp(E2) + u(x)(1− p(E2)) +Mp(E2) + λ
[∫
E2
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E2)
]}
Again, R(λ) is a continuous function of λ and the LHS of equation (A.11) is a constant of λ. Thus
it suffices to show R(0) > LHS and R(1) < LHS.
For R(0) one has,
R(0) = min
p∈C
{u(fǫ) · qfp(E2) + u(x)(1− p(E2)) +Mp(E2)}
≥ min
p∈C
{u(fǫ) · qfp(E2) + u(x)(1− p(E2))}
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≥ min
p∈C
{u(x)p(E2) + u(x)(1− p(E2))}
= u(x)
> min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fǫE1x)dp = LHS
On the other hand for R(1),
R(1) = min
p∈C
{
u(fǫ) · qfp(E2) + u(x)(1− p(E2)) +Mp(E2) +
[∫
E2
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E2)
]}
≤ 2ǫ+min
p∈C
{∫
E2
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E2)
}
For the second term as α[E2] is unique, its minimum is negative. Therefore, it suffices to find ǫ > 0
such that
ǫ < −
1
2
min
p∈C
{∫
E2
u(g)dp− u(g) · qgp(E2)
}
Then given this ǫ one has
R(1) < 2ǫ− 2ǫ = 0 ≤ LHS
Therefore, the existence of λ ∈ (0, 1) that solves equation (A.14) is guaranteed.
Finally, once λ is solved, u(y) is given by equation (A.14):
u(y) =
u(fǫ) · qf +M − λu(g) · qg
1− λ
≥ −
λ
1− λ
u(g) · qg
where the last inequality comes from u(fǫ(ω))+M ≥ 0. It remains to show that u(y) ≥ u when u
exists to guarantee the existence of this construction. It suffices to transform g by taking mixtures
with constant acts such that u(g) · qg ≤ 0.
From this point on, apply exactly the same argument in step 3 of the proof of Theorem 3.3
would imply that α[E1] = α[E2]. Therefore, α[E] needs to be a constant across all strict%-nonnull
E ∈ Σ.
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Appendix B ML with Infinitely Many Extreme Points
The characterization results in the main text rely on the assumption that the set of priors C has
finitely many extreme points. As mentioned, such an assumption helps simplify the axioms while
conveys the same intuition. This appendix provides an axiomatization of ML without this assump-
tion. The axiomatizations of RML in this case could be achieved in a similar manner.
Without this assumption, the ex-ante preference % is only assumed to admit a MEU represen-
tation. The set of priors C could have infinitely many extreme points. Except for this, every other
assumption on the primitive {%E}E∈Σ is the same as in Section 2.
By definition, {%E}E∈Σ is represented by ML updating if for all strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ and
for all f ∈ F :
min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(f)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
For the current setting where C may contain infinitely many extreme points, consider the fol-
lowing axiom:
Axiom Approximate CR-S (ApproximateContingentReasoning given Sufficiently good con-
sequences).
For all f ∈ Fand for all x, z, w ∈ X with z ≻ w, there exists x¯E,f,z,w such that for all x
∗ ∈ X
with x∗ % x¯E,f,z,w, if f ∼E x, then
1
2
fEx
∗ +
1
2
w ≺
1
2
xEx
∗ +
1
2
z
and
1
2
fEx
∗ +
1
2
z ≻
1
2
xEx
∗ +
1
2
w
Notice that CR-S implies Approximate CR-S. On the other hand, in the case where CR-S is
silent as x¯E,f does not exist, Approximate CR-S imposes an additional restriction on the behav-
iors. It restricts that the difference between fEx
∗ and xEx
∗ should be arbitrarily small when x∗ is
sufficiently good.
Hence, Approximate CR-S conveys essentially the same intuition as CR-S. The following rep-
resentation theorem shows that Approximate CR-S is equivalent to ML in the current setting.
Theorem B.1. {%E}E∈Σ is represented by ML updating if and only if Approximate CR-S holds for
all strict %-nonnull events E.
Proof of Theorem B.1. First consider the following lemma:
Lemma B.2. For any strict %-nonnull E ∈ Σ and f ∈ F , for any ǫ > 0 there exists x¯E,f,ǫ ∈ X
such that
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp < ǫ
for all x∗ % x¯E,f,ǫ.
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Proof of Lemma B.2. For any strict%-nonnullE ∈ Σ and f ∈ F , either there exists x¯E,f such that
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
for all x∗ % x¯E,f or not. If it is the first case, then this lemma is trivially true.
Consider the case there does not exist x¯E,f for some E and f . For each x ∈ X , let px be the
probabilitymeasure inC that evaluates the act fEx according toMEU, i.e. px ≡ argminp∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp.
Let q denote the probability measure in C∗(E) that evaluates the act fEx and notice that it does
not depend on the value of x.
Then one has
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
=
∫
E
u(f)dq + u(x)(1− p∗(E))−
∫
E
u(f)dpx − u(x)(1− px(E))
Take derivative with respect to u(x) and apply envelope theorem yields
d
du(x)
[
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp
]
= px(E)− p
∗(E)
The current assumption px /∈ C
∗(E) implies that px(E) − p
∗(E) < 0, i.e. the difference
is decreasing with respect to u(x). Furthermore, since the difference is bounded below by zero,
monotone convergence theorem implies that
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx)dp→ 0
for u(x)→∞, i.e. the lemma holds.
For the necessity of Approximate CR-S, recall Lemma A.1 implies that if f ∼E x then under
ML updating
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp
Thus for any ǫ > 0 there exists x¯E,f,ǫ such that
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp < ǫ
for all x∗ % x¯E,f,ǫ. Then for each z ≻ w, it suffices to let ǫ = u(z)− u(w) and then Approximate
CR-S axiom holds.
For the sufficiency, fix any strict %-nonnull E and consider the contra positive statement: not
ML updating implies not Approximate CR-S axiom. Not ML means that CE 6= {p/p(E) : p ∈
C∗(E)}. In other words, either there exists p˜ ∈ C∗(E) such that p˜/p˜(E) /∈ CE or there exists
q ∈ CE such that q /∈ {p/p(E) : p ∈ C
∗(E)} or both.
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Consider the first case, by the same argument implied by the Hahn-Banach Theorem in the
proof of Theorem 2.4, there exists f ∈ F and x ∈ X such that f ∼E x and
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
< u(x)
Then for all x∗ % x,
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp = u(x)p∗(E)− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)dp > 0
That is, there exists δE,f > 0 such that
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp > δE,f > 0
Now for all x∗ % x,
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
= min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp+ min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp
> δE,f > 0
the first inequality comes from the fact that min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp ≥ 0. Then
it suffices to find z ≻ w such that u(z)− u(w) < δE,f and it will imply that for all x
∗ % x:
1
2
fEx
∗ +
1
2
z ≺
1
2
xEx
∗ +
1
2
w
i.e. the Approximate CR-S axiom fails.
Now consider the second case, there exists q ∈ CE such that q /∈ {p/p(E) : p ∈ C
∗(E)}. By
Hahn-Banach theorem, there exists f ∼E x such that
u(x) = min
p∈CE
∫
Ω
u(f)dp ≤
∫
Ω
u(f)dq < min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)
dp
p(E)
Then it further implies for all x∗ % x,
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp = min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
E
u(f)dp− u(x)p∗(E) > 0
i.e. there exists δE,f such that
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp > δE,f > 0
On the other hand, by Lemma B.2, for any ǫ > 0 there exists x¯E,f,ǫsuch that
min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp < ǫ
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for all x∗ % x¯E,f,ǫ. Now for all x
∗ % max{x, x¯E,f,ǫ},
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp
= min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp− min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp+ min
p∈C∗(E)
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp
> −ǫ+ δE,f
Now find any z ≻ w such that u(z) − u(w) = η < δE,f and let ǫ = δE,f − η > 0. Then for all
x∗ % max{x, x¯E,f,ǫ} the previous result implies that
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp > −ǫ+ δE,f = η > 0
Then
1
2
min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(fEx
∗)dp+
1
2
u(w)−min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(xEx
∗)dp−
1
2
u(z) >
1
2
[η − η] = 0
i.e. 1
2
fEx
∗ + 1
2
w ≻ 1
2
xEx
∗ + 1
2
z for all x∗ % x¯E,f,ǫ. Thus the Approximate CR-S axiom fails in
this case as well. Combine both cases shows that, not ML implies not Approximate CR-S.
Remark. The characterization results for Contingent RML and RML can be extended similarly
to this more general case. For example, CR-UO can be approximated by requiring the difference
between fEx
∗ and some x′Ex
∗ with x′Ex
∗ % xEx
∗ to be arbitrarily small as x∗ goes to infinity. The
statement of the axioms and also the additional steps in the proof will be analogously the same,
thus omitted in this paper.
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Appendix C Experimental results in Liang (2019)
I include the table 4.2 in Liang (2019) mentioned in the main text for reference. Because of
the difference in terminologies, I first summarize the one-to-one mapping from his terms to the
parameters I used in example 2:
Prior β
(Midpoint) Information accuracy (λ1 + λ2)/2
Good news s1
Bad news s2
Type of information (simple) Probabilistic signals
Type of information (ambiguous) Ambiguous signals
Table 4.2 in Liang (2019) is shown in the following. The Mean conditional CE represents
the evaluation of a bet on the state θ1. Thus, for example in the first row of the following table,
the Mean conditional CE under the ambiguous information is 10.35, lower than under the simple
information 10.80. This is consistent with the prediction summarized by table 1 (the row with
β < 1/2 and s1).
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Prior
(Midpoint)
Information
accuracy
Good/Bad
news
Type of
information
Mean
conditional
CE
Standard
error
N
simple 10.80 0.645 54
30% 70% good compound 9.48 0.603 44
ambiguous 10.35 0.739 47
simple 10.19 0.533 91
40% 60% good compound 8.96 0.491 85
ambiguous 10.10 0.490 60
simple 12.51 0.362 164
50% 70% good compound 11.99 0.349 164
ambiguous 10.88 0.346 165
simple 12.45 0.391 73
60% 60% good compound 12.10 0.463 80
ambiguous 9.61 0.452 105
simple 14.74 0.369 111
70% 70% good compound 13.45 0.397 121
ambiguous 13.74 0.381 118
simple 5.70 0.368 111
30% 70% bad compound 5.38 0.355 121
ambiguous 5.48 0.345 118
simple 6.89 0.400 73
40% 60% bad compound 7.89 0.490 80
ambiguous 5.95 0.390 105
simple 6.47 0.345 165
50% 70% bad compound 6.99 0.306 163
ambiguous 6.93 0.314 165
simple 7.46 0.496 91
60% 60% bad compound 7.48 0.431 85
ambiguous 9.58 0.474 60
simple 7.20 0.672 54
70% 70% bad compound 9.70 0.651 44
ambiguous 9.34 0.720 47
simple 7.10 0.361 163
30% 50% compound 7.50 0.374 164
ambiguous 7.29 0.334 164
simple 10.88 0.336 163
70% 50% compound 10.34 0.349 164
ambiguous 10.21 0.369 163
Table C.1: Table 4.2 in Liang (2019)
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